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JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF
NATIONAL SECURITY:
Executive Restrictions of Civil Liberties When
“Fears and Prejudices Are Aroused”
Tania Cruz1
As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution
that in times of war or declared military necessity our
institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional
guarantees . . . that in times of distress the shield of
military necessity and national security must not be used
to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and
accountability . . . that in times of international hostility
and antagonisms our institutions, legislative, executive
and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority
to protect all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices
that are so easily aroused.
Judge Marilyn Hall Patel2

I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the Twin Towers collapsed before the world’s eyes,
President George W. Bush declared to Americans that in the quest for
justice, “we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in
our world.”3 Despite those resounding words, the United States immediately arrested 1,200 Arab and Muslim men with no direct links to
terrorism.4 It also held secret deportation hearings in cases dubbed “special
interest,”5 and designated American citizens “enemy combatants,”
indefinitely detaining them absent fundamental liberties.6 Thus began
America’s “war on terror.”7
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In the war’s early stages, Americans watched as the nation’s leaders
retaliated against those who devastated the country. As the war on terror
evolved, however, many executive actions appeared unrelated to protecting
America’s people and institutions from another attack. Rather, according to
observers, those actions were integral to an executive plan to extend its
power beyond constitutional boundaries under the mantle of national
security.8 So began what some are calling the executive’s attack on civil
liberties.9
Central to this claimed constitutional excess is the executive’s concerted
effort to abolish meaningful judicial review of its actions. According to
prominent retired federal judges and attorneys, this effort represents “one of
the gravest threats to the rule of law, and to the liberty our Constitution
enshrines, that the nation has ever faced.”10
This article observes that during times of national security fears, the
judiciary often embraces the executive’s arguments of minimal judicial
review and fails to closely scrutinize government national security actions.
Historically, this excessive judicial deference has led to numerous civil
liberties disasters.11
After September 11, 2001, through the use of newly created threshold
security designations, the executive devised a method to effectively strip
Americans of fundamental liberties.12 The executive argues that these
threshold designations, including enemy combatant status, when coupled
with a minimalist evidentiary standard, are immune from meaningful
judicial review.13 The potential for a present day civil liberties disaster is
therefore at hand.
To ensure meaningful and independent review of executive restrictions
that curtail civil liberties during times of national stress, this article
contends that a rigorous framework of judicial review is warranted. The
article then offers a national security civil liberties framework of judicial
review that applies heightened scrutiny to national security threshold
designations and the evidence used to support such designations.14
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As a foundation for this assertion, Section II of this article briefly
examines Korematsu v. United States and the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure
to engage in meaningful judicial review of Executive Order 9066 that led to
the internment of 120,000 Japanese American citizens.15 To demonstrate
the need for heightened judicial scrutiny, Section also discusses the
subsequent coram nobis litigation that unearthed government documents
proving that the executive order to intern Japanese Americans was in fact
based on racial animus and not military necessity,16 thereby vindicating
those the government interned.
Section III studies the enemy combatant / indefinite detention cases. The
section begins by discussing the World War II case, Ex Parte Quirin,17 to
demonstrate that the executive’s reliance on it as legal precedent is
misplaced. The section then examines the first two enemy combatant cases,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld18 and Padilla v. Bush,19 to illustrate the new form of
deference some federal courts are giving the executive.
Section IV will first assess the judiciary’s proper role during times of
national fears and upheaval by examining judicial history and contrasting
approaches to judicial review of executive actions. The section will then
offer a national security civil liberties framework of judicial review for
analyzing contemporary executive actions that will prevent the unnecessary
curtailment of civil liberties in the name of national security. In doing so,
Section IV will illustrate how the executive is using threshold designations
and a highly deferential evidentiary standard to avert heightened judicial
scrutiny of its substantive liberty deprivations. Applying the proposed
framework, the section will then demonstrate why heightened judicial
review of the enemy combatant designation is appropriate and how it
accommodates both national security concerns and civil liberties—as
distinguished from deferential review and the imbalance it tolerates.
Section V concludes the article discussing how the executive is at times
subverting American fundamental liberties by using a newly developed
analysis.
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II. NATIONAL SECURITY RESTRICTIONS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
THE ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW—LESSONS FROM
KOREMATSU
A. Korematsu and the Japanese American Internment
In 1942, the U.S. government convicted Fred Korematsu for refusing to
obey its military wartime exclusion orders. These orders precipitated the
mass internment of 120,000 Japanese Americans without individualized
determinations that any of them posed a threat to national security.20 In its
review of Executive Order 9066, which mandated the Japanese American
exclusion leading to the internment, the U.S. Supreme Court in Korematsu
v. United States began its opinion by stating that “all legal restrictions
which curtail civil liberties of a single racial group are immediately
suspect,” such that “courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”21
Rather than review the government’s exclusion orders under “strict
scrutiny,” however, the Court proceeded to do the opposite.
The Court relied on Hirabayashi v. United States, an earlier decision that
upheld the conviction of Gordon Hirabayashi, another Japanese American
who had refused to obey a racial curfew order.22 Although the Supreme
Court in Hirabayashi claimed that its holding was narrow and applied only
to the curfew issue, the Korematsu Court later cited to Hirabayashi to
justify Fred Korematsu’s conviction and, ultimately, the Japanese American
internment.23
The Court in Korematsu claimed it would strictly scrutinize Executive
Order 9066, but it failed to review the order under even “rational basis.”
Rather than providing a meaningful review of the factual record, the Court
took judicial notice of all the government’s conclusions concerning racial
stereotypes and the danger of espionage and sabotage that west coast
Japanese Americans allegedly posed.24 Despite published rumors that the
government shielded intelligence reports showing there was no threat of
espionage or sabotage by Japanese Americans and that mass internment was

CIVIL LIBERTIES POST-SEPTEMBER 11

Judicial Scrutiny of National Security 133

unnecessary, the U.S. Supreme Court simply took judicial notice of the
falsified documents the government used to advance its position that
Japanese Americans posed a threat to U.S. security.25
B. Reopening Korematsu: The 1980s Coram Nobis Cases
Years later, de-classified documents were obtained through Freedom of
Information Act requests, revealing two extraordinary facts. First, all of the
government intelligence services investigating the so-called “Japanese
Problem” on the west coast and allegations of Japanese American espionage
and sabotage unequivocally informed the heads of the military and War and
Justice Departments that the west coast Japanese, as a group, posed no
national security danger, and there existed no need for mass exclusion.26
Second, the War and Justice Departments deliberately misled a highly
deferential Supreme Court about the ostensible “military necessity” basis of
the Korematsu decision.27
Based on this newly discovered information, on January 19, 1983, Fred
Korematsu filed a Writ of Error of Coram Nobis.28 Korematsu sought to
reopen his World War II case and vacate his forty year-old conviction. On
November 11, 1983, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel, finding “manifest injustice,”
granted the petition on the merits,29 ultimately determining that the War and
Justice Departments during World War II had altered, suppressed, and
destroyed key evidence that demonstrated the absence of military necessity
for the mass racial internment.30
The government’s misrepresentations to the Court in the original
Korematsu case and the Court’s deferential acceptance of the government’s
falsified position endorsed the mass incarceration of innocent people
because of their race. In accepting as fact the government’s assertion that
Japanese Americans posed a threat to national security, “the Court not only
legitimized the dislocation and imprisonment of loyal citizens without trial
solely on account of race, but it also weakened a fundamental tenet of
American democracy—government accountability for military control over
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civilians.”31
The Court’s deference, despite its pronouncement of
heightened scrutiny, has been sharply criticized as subverting civil liberties
to falsified claims of national security.32 Thus, the coram nobis cases
cogently demonstrate the imperative of applying heightened judicial
scrutiny in cases where fundamental liberties are at stake.
Almost sixty years after the Supreme Court’s now infamous Korematsu
opinion, the executive is once again attempting to limit judicial review of
fundamental liberty restrictions ostensibly justified by national security
concerns.33 Many of its arguments mirror those offered in Korematsu—
national security threats and military necessity mandate extreme judicial
deference to the executive branch.34 In fact, even the evidence used to
justify current executive actions—a declaration by an unknown government
official named Mobbs—resembles the DeWitt Report the Koremastu Court
had relied on.35 However, rather than simply demanding absolute deference
as in Korematsu, the executive has devised a new means to potentially
shield its actions from judicial review.36

III. CIVIL LIBERTIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS UNDER ATTACK: THE
HAMDI AND PADILLA ENEMY COMBATANT CASES
In a deeply disturbing dimension of the war on terror, the executive has
pursued American citizens and detained them indefinitely absent charges,
access to counsel, habeas corpus proceedings, or trial, all on the
government’s “say-so.”37 These executive actions call into serious question
the executive’s power to unilaterally declare U.S. citizens enemy
combatants. By labeling these citizens “enemy combatants,” a term used
historically to classify offenders of the laws of war,38 the executive proffers
that it can deny these individuals fundamental liberties during times of war
and peace.39 According to the executive’s tortured logic, enemy combatants
are not criminals who are guilty of wrongdoing. This is precisely why the
government can indefinitely detain them without habeas proceedings, the
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Seventh Amendment right to a trial
by jury, or the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ right to due process.40
For nearly two years, the executive has detained American citizens Yaser
Esam Hamdi41 and Jose Padilla42 as enemy combatants.43 Challenges to
their detention have fallen mainly on deaf ears as members of the federal
judiciary have deferred almost entirely to the executive’s unilateral
determination that these men are enemy combatants, a label that supposedly
makes them ineligible for constitutional protection.44 Relying primarily on
Ex Parte Quirin, a World War II German saboteur case that allowed U.S.
enemy belligerents to be tried and punished by military tribunals even
though the civil courts were open, the executive claims that the United
States has a history of designating its citizens enemy combatants and
detaining them indefinitely without charges.45 However, a closer reading of
Ex Parte Quirin reveals that the executive’s reliance on this case is
misplaced and that there exists no legal or historical precedent—outside of
Korematsu—for the executive’s extraordinary actions.46
A. What is an Enemy Combatant
In Ex Parte Quirin,47 eight German nationals and possibly one U.S.
citizen originally from Germany were captured by the United States as they
attempted to enter the country for purposes of “sabotage, espionage, hostile
or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war.”48 The executive
maintained that because they were not lawful combatants fighting for an
enemy army, they could be tried before a military tribunal under the
Articles of War.49 The eight petitioners challenged the government’s
authority, arguing that under the U.S. Constitution, Art. III, § 2, and the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, they had a right to a jury trial at common law
in the civil courts.50 Furthermore, they argued that under Ex Parte
Milligan,51 they were entitled to a civil trial because the civil courts were
open and functioning normally.52 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected these
arguments, holding that petitioners were unlawful belligerents and that

VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 1 • 2003

136 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

under the Articles of War they were not entitled to be tried in civil
proceedings or by jury.53 The Court also determined that trying the
petitioners before a military tribunal did not violate the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments because they were not charged with “crimes” or involved in
“criminal prosecutions.”54
Quirin is notable for the proposition that the government can try U.S.
citizens through military tribunals when they have violated the laws of war,
notwithstanding that the civil courts are open. Most recently, however, it
has become significant for its use of the label “enemy combatant”—words
not found in the American lexicon until now.55 In defining enemy
combatant, the Quirin Court differentiated this new class of individuals
from lawful combatants who are “subject to capture and detention as
prisoners of war by opposing military forces.”56 Enemy combatants are
thus unlawful combatants who, in addition to being subject to capture and
detention, “are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts
which render their belligerency unlawful.”57
The spy . . . or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes
secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents
who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of
prisoners, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals.58
Thus, Quirin stands for the proposition that the executive can deem a
U.S. citizen an enemy combatant, and then attempt to punish him in a
military court rather than in a civil court, which would provide a full range
of procedural and constitutional protections. It does not, however, stand for
the “sweeping proposition”59 the executive is presently asserting—that it
can unilaterally designate a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant and then hold
the individual without charges, access to counsel, habeas proceedings, trial,
and judicial review.60 Quirin explicitly stated that enemy combatants must
be charged and tried before they are punished. In Quirin, the petitioners
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had at least a rudimentary form of due process, unlike petitioners Hamdi
and Padilla.61
As discussed below, in the present enemy combatant cases, the executive
does not seek to charge Hamdi or Padilla, let alone try or punish them based
on their guilt.62 Although indefinite detention in solitary confinement, as
Hamdi and Padilla are currently facing, is clearly a form of punishment, the
executive explicitly states that these men are not criminals and argues that
their detention is not punitive.63 Instead, the executive claims that the
purpose of their indefinite—and possibly perpetual—detention64 is to
prevent them from rejoining enemy forces or, at a minimum, to hold them
pending further investigation.65
Moreover, the executive claims that Quirin provides it with the legal
precedent to take these actions.66 However, the executive’s reliance on
Quirin is misplaced because the case stands only for a change in tribunal,
not for indefinite detention. Furthermore, Quirin does not stand for the
proposition that the executive may detain American citizens
incommunicado without access to counsel. The defendants in Quirin were
afforded counsel, and the Court clarified that enemy combatants have
standing to contest convictions for war crimes by habeas proceedings.67
Quirin arose in the context of World War II, providing little question
about who the enemy was or whether the petitioners were in fact enemy
combatants. As the district court in Padilla recognized, the decision in
Quirin turned not on whether the detainees were enemy combatants, but on
whether enemy combatants—even if U.S. citizens—could be detained and
tried by the military.68
In the war on terror, where the United States is fighting an illusive and
undeclared enemy, battle lines are hazy, making the executive’s power to
label an American citizen as an enemy combatant especially broad.69 As
numerous former and sitting federal judges and legal practitioners have
recognized, it is the judiciary’s role to review the executive’s designation of
Americans as enemy combatants, particularly since the executive’s
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designation strips them of fundamental liberties, including freedom itself.70
Even the deferential Quirin Court recognized that the courts’ duty “in time
of war, as well as in time of peace, [is] to preserve unimpaired the
constitutional safeguards of civil liberty.”71 As the following Hamdi and
Padilla cases demonstrate, absent independent judicial review, the
executive wields “far too broad power to imprison a citizen declared to be
an ‘enemy’ of the state; [it is] power alarmingly akin to that routinely
exercised by totalitarian governments over dissidents.”72
B. Hamdi: An American Captured on Foreign Soil
Yaser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen born in St. Louis and raised in Saudi
Arabia, was captured by Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan and
brought to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for detention.73 Upon discovering he
was an American citizen, U.S. forces transferred him to the Norfolk Naval
Station Brig.74 He has remained in government custody since April 2002.75
Although Hamdi’s habeas petition76 acknowledged that Northern Alliance
seized him in Afghanistan during a time of active military conflict, it also
asserted that “as an American citizen . . . Hamdi enjoys the full protections
of the Constitution,”77 and that the government’s current detention of him in
this country without charges, access to a judicial trial, or to counsel
“violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.”78
On June 11, 2002, before the executive had an opportunity to respond to
Hamdi’s petition, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
appointed Hamdi a public defender and ordered the executive to allow
Hamdi unmonitored access to counsel.79 On July 12, 2002, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order allowing Hamdi
access to counsel and castigated the lower court for not deferring to the
executive in national security matters.80
The executive also attempted to dismiss Hamdi’s petition on the merits,
claiming it had the power to unilaterally declare any U.S. citizen an enemy
combatant without judicial oversight.81 The Fourth Circuit, however,
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denied the executive’s motion, stating its reluctance to “embrace [the]
sweeping proposition . . . that with no meaningful review, any American
citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely
without charges or counsel on the government’s say-so.”82
The Fourth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to
determine Hamdi’s status. In doing so, however, the court was pre-saging
the outcome on remand by noting “that if Hamdi is indeed an ‘enemy
combatant’ who was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the
executive’s present detention of him is a lawful one.”83
On remand, the district court proceeded to follow the Fourth Circuit’s
instructions by attempting to determine whether the executive’s designation
of Hamdi as an enemy combatant was in fact justified.84 As its sole support,
the executive offered a two-page, nine-paragraph declaration written by
Special Adviser Michael H. Mobbs.85 On August 13, 2002, in accordance
with the Fourth Circuit’s instructions, district court Judge Doumar
conducted a hearing focusing on the central issue of “whether the Mobbs
Declaration, standing alone, was sufficient justification for a person born in
the United States to be held without charges, incommunicado, in solitary
confinement, without access to counsel on U.S. soil.”86 On August 16,
2002, Judge Doumar issued an order finding that the Mobbs Declaration,
standing alone, was insufficient to permit meaningful judicial review of
Hamdi’s detention.87
Most importantly, Judge Doumar carefully defined the appropriate
judicial role in national security related cases: “a meaningful judicial review
must at the minimum”88 determine if the government’s classification was
determined pursuant to appropriate authority, the screening criteria used to
make and maintain that classification is consistent with due process, and the
basis of the continued detention serves national security.89 Based on its
preliminary review, the district court found that the Mobbs Declaration fell
“far short of even these minimum criteria for judicial review.”90 The
district court arrived at this conclusion because the allegations in the Mobbs
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Declaration were, in large part, drawn from hearsay supplied by relatively
unknown members of Northern Alliance forces alleged to have acted as
bounty hunters.91 Rather than exclude the Mobbs Declaration entirely,
however, the court ordered the executive to produce complete copies of any
other statements made by Hamdi in order to conduct a proper judicial
review of his classification.92 The court noted that the Mobbs Declaration
was “little more than the government’s ‘say so’ regarding the validity of
Hamdi’s classification as an enemy combatant”93 and that by accepting it at
face value, the court would be “abdicating any semblance of the most
minimal level of judicial review . . . acting as little more than a rubber
stamp.”94
On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling that the
Mobbs Declaration standing alone was sufficient to sustain Hamdi’s
indefinite detention as an enemy combatant and that Hamdi’s petition
should be dismissed. Even though Judge Wilkinson, writing for the Fourth
Circuit, acknowledged that the hearsay-laden Mobbs Declaration could be
challenged for inconsistency and incompleteness, he severely chastised the
district court for not showing the government the proper level of deference:
To be sure, a capable attorney could challenge the hearsay nature
of the Mobbs declaration and probe each and every paragraph for
incompleteness and inconsistency, as the district court attempted to
do. The court’s approach, however, had a single flaw. We are not
here dealing with a defendant who has been indicted on criminal
charges in the exercise of the executive’s law enforcement
powers.95
Judge Wilkinson, somewhat disingenuously, criticized Judge Doumar for
indicating that he was “challenging everything in the Mobbs Declaration
and that he intended to ‘pick it apart’ ‘piece by piece.’”96 In fact, the
district court did as the Fourth Circuit had instructed. It considered “the
sufficiency of the Mobbs declaration as an independent matter before
proceeding further.”97 And, although the Fourth Circuit maintained that

CIVIL LIBERTIES POST-SEPTEMBER 11

Judicial Scrutiny of National Security 141

“the detention of U.S. citizens must be subject to judicial review,”98 those
words appeared to be little more than lip service since the court deferred
entirely to the executive’s determination that Hamdi was in fact an enemy
combatant, asking for no further evidence. The Fourth Circuit instead relied
on the unprecedented “zone of active combat” test in finding that the
executive’s decision to detain Hamdi indefinitely as an enemy combatant
was constitutional.
Because it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of
active military combat in a foreign theater of conflict . . . the
submitted declaration is sufficient basis upon which to conclude
that the commander in chief has constitutionally detained Hamdi
pursuant to the war powers entrusted to him in the United States
Constitution.99
In sum, the Fourth Circuit ruled that when the executive branch asserts it
has seized an American citizen in a zone of active combat, that citizen
might not challenge or otherwise dispute those assertions. Thus, the
executive can indefinitely incarcerate a U.S. citizen even though an official
with no personal knowledge of the underlying facts made the assertions
supporting the detention.100
The Fourth Circuit did not ascertain how the U.S. military determined
that Hamdi was allied with enemy forces or the sufficiency of the Mobbs
Declaration standing alone, although it had previously instructed the district
court to make the determination. Instead, the court boldly concluded that
“the factual averments in the affidavits, if accurate, are sufficient to confirm
Hamdi’s detention,”101 without considering whether the factual averments
were indeed accurate. In fact, the court declined completely to evaluate the
accuracy of the factual averments.
In support of its contention that no further factual inquiry was necessary,
the executive advocated that courts apply the highly deferential “some
evidence” standard in evaluating habeas petitions in “areas where the
executive has primary authority.”102 Recognizing that the “standard has
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indeed been employed in contexts less constitutionally sensitive than the
present one,”103 the Fourth Circuit declined to adopt the deferential some
evidence standard because it deemed any factual inquiry into the Mobbs
Declaration unnecessary. The Court stated, “It is not necessary for us to
decide whether the ‘some evidence’ standard is the correct one to be applied
in this case because we are persuaded for other reasons that a factual inquiry
into the circumstances of Hamdi’s capture would be inappropriate.”104
In denying Hamdi the right to counsel and his request for habeas relief,
the Fourth Circuit clarified that its holding was narrow and limited to
Hamdi’s situation because he was captured in a zone of active combat in a
foreign theater of war.105 Replete with deferential language, the court cited
several times to the government’s war-making powers, explaining that
“delving into Hamdi’s status and capture would require [the court] to step
so far out of its role . . . that [it] would abandon the distinctive deference
that animates this area of law.”106 Referring to the then pending Padilla
case, the court asserted that it would not proclaim “any broad or categorical
holdings on enemy combatant designation”107 and would not “address the
designation as an enemy combatant of an American citizen captured on
American soil or the role counsel might play in such a proceeding.”108
Hamdi sought rehearing by the original panel or in the alternative
rehearing en banc.109 By a ruling of eight to four, the Fourth Circuit denied
rehearing.110 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Motz sharply criticized Judge
Wilkinson and the original panel for “abrogat[ing] . . . constitutional rights”
in declaring Hamdi an enemy combatant based solely on “a short hearsay
declaration by Michael Mobbs—an unelected, otherwise unknown,
government ‘advisor.’”111
Despite the executive’s apparent lack of evidentiary support, Judge
Wilkinson fittingly observed that the judiciary has traditionally afforded the
executive great deference when it makes decisions in the theater of war.112
However, what if the executive captures an American citizen on U.S. soil,
completely outside the theater of war, where there are no hindrances to
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collecting evidence or impracticalities to making officials justify their
actions? In that case, should the executive be afforded unlimited deference
in claiming that any U.S. citizen, regardless of where, when, and how he
was captured is an enemy combatant and is therefore ineligible for
constitutional protections? Federal courts are currently addressing this
question in the ongoing Padilla case.
C. Padilla: An American Captured on U.S. Soil
Jose Padilla, a U.S. born Puerto Rican American who converted to Islam,
was arrested at the Chicago airport in May 2002 as a “material witness” in
an investigation related to September 11.113 Following his removal on May
15, 2002, from Chicago to New York, he appeared before the district court,
which appointed him counsel.114 Following a conference on May 22, 2002,
with his attorney, Donna Newman, Padilla moved to vacate his material
witness warrant.115 On June 9, 2002, the government notified the court ex
parte that it was withdrawing the subpoena, and the court vacated the
warrant.116 The executive then immediately designated Padilla an enemy
combatant, took custody of him, and transferred him to a South Carolina
prison where he was no longer permitted to speak to his counsel.117
Although the executive informed his counsel that she could write to Padilla,
it indicated that he might not receive the correspondence.118
Immediately after designating Padilla an enemy combatant, Attorney
General John Ashcroft and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed
publicly that Padilla had planned to steal radioactive material within the
United States to build and detonate a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty
bomb,” on U.S. soil.119 In support of its contention, the executive once
again offered only a conclusory seven paragraph Mobbs Declaration
contending that Padilla is “closely associated with Al Qaeda,”120 engaged in
“hostile and war-like acts,”121 including “preparation for acts of
international terrorism”122 directed at this country.123
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On June 11, 2002, through his “next friend” Donna Newman, Padilla
filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York.124 The executive moved to dismiss Padilla’s habeas
petition on jurisdictional grounds. First, the executive asserted that the
district court lacked jurisdiction because Donna Newman did not qualify as
a next friend.125 Second, the executive contended that the district court
lacked jurisdiction over the case because no proper respondent with custody
over Padilla was present within the court’s jurisdiction.126 The habeas
petition named President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Attorney
General Ashcroft, and Commander M.A. Marr as respondents. According
to the executive, Commander Marr, the commanding officer in the Naval
Brig in South Carolina where Padilla was being detained, was the only
proper respondent.127 Thus, the executive argued that only the South
Carolina district court had habeas jurisdiction.128 In response to the court’s
request that the parties submit additional briefing on the issues of
petitioner’s right to counsel, the executive contended that Padilla did not
have the right to consult with counsel because he was being held as enemy
combatant pursuant to the laws and customs of war, rather than as a
criminal.129
On December 4, 2002, Judge Mukasey granted Padilla limited access to
counsel to present facts in support of the habeas petition. The court began
its opinion by holding that Donna Newman had standing to bring the habeas
petition on Padilla’s behalf.130 Next, the court addressed who the proper
respondent was. Finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over President
Bush and Commander Marr, the court dismissed the petition against
them.131 However, the court found that Secretary Rumsfeld was the proper
respondent and that the district court had jurisdiction over him.132 Finally,
the court concluded that because Padilla’s attorney, Donna Newman, was in
New York and had begun working to secure his release before the executive
removed Padilla to South Carolina, it would not transfer the case to South
Carolina.133

CIVIL LIBERTIES POST-SEPTEMBER 11

Judicial Scrutiny of National Security 145

In addressing the substantive merits of the case, the district court
reviewed whether the executive had the power to designate a U.S. citizen
captured on American soil as an enemy combatant, detain him without
access to counsel, and withhold trial for the duration of the war on terror.
Relying primarily on a strained reading of Quirin, the district court ruled
that the President has the unilateral power to designate American citizens
enemy combatants.134 The district court, however, never addressed the
issue of whether Padilla was indeed an enemy combatant. Instead, the court
took great lengths to explain that the executive receives due deference in its
war making capacity. The court failed to acknowledge that Padilla’s case
falls outside the executive’s express war powers, because government
officials did not apprehend Padilla in a zone of active combat, and he is an
American citizen initially detained as a material witness on U.S. soil.135
The court conceded that no “lush and vibrant jurisprudence”136 exists
governing whether an enemy combatant can be held indefinitely, agreeing
that Quirin really does not offer the “proper precedential value for the
government’s determination.”137 To justify its deference in light of this
admission, the court instead relied on Justice Jackson’s words regarding
deference to the executive.138 This was the same justice who, in his ringing
dissent in Korematsu, warned that the majority’s opinion stood as a “loaded
weapon” to be used at a later time “for the hand of any authority that can
bring forward a plausible claim of urgent need.”139
1. The “Some Evidence” Standard
Although the district court ultimately allowed Padilla access to counsel,
the ruling was so narrow that it amounted to little more than a pretense.140
In Padilla, the court granted Padilla access to counsel for the limited
purpose of presenting facts to the court regarding his habeas petition.141 On
its face, it appears the court was not excessively deferential to the executive,
which argued that the court should deny Padilla access to counsel entirely.
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Upon closer examination, however, to defer is precisely what the court
chose to do.
Judge Mukasey stated that Padilla’s access to counsel would be limited
solely to presenting facts to the court.142 Rather than basing his ruling on
the broad Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Judge Mukasey granted access
to counsel narrowly based on the All Writs Act,143 which “permits a court to
which a § 2241 [habeas] petition is addressed to appoint counsel for
petitioner if the court determines that ‘interests of justice so require.’”144
This statutory, rather than constitutional, ruling excluded Padilla from using
counsel to conduct discovery, cross-examine witnesses, and meaningfully
rebut the executive’s testimony.145 Coupled with the new “some evidence”
standard for establishing the executive’s enemy combatant designation, the
ruling assured that the habeas proceedings would be little more than a show.
In Padilla, the executive argued that courts should review its enemy
combatant designation under the highly deferential and improperly applied
some evidence standard.146 Although earlier the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi
had declined to adopt it, finding no necessity for further factual inquiry,147
the district court in Padilla did adopt the standard.
The deferential some evidence standard is an administrative agency
tribunal standard inapplicable to first impression judicial proceedings,
because it “presupposes there has been some underlying adversarial hearing
at which a record was created . . .”148 and procedural due process afforded.
Civil and criminal proceedings for pretrial detention in which the
government is presenting its initial case apply, at a minimum, the “clear and
convincing standard.”
Courts have traditionally applied the some evidence standard in
reviewing prison disciplinary proceedings and immigration hearings after
due process has been afforded.149 The purpose of the standard is to ensure
that there is some evidence to support a factual determination that the
executive has not arbitrarily deprived a person of liberty.150 Because courts
have applied the some evidence standard following adversarial proceedings,
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they have found it unnecessary to examine the entire record to ensure that
the deprivations of liberty are not arbitrary.151 Thus, according to Supreme
Court precedent, the some evidence standard “does not require examination
of the entire record, independent assessment of witnesses’ credibility, or
weighing of the evidence . . .”152
Under the some evidence standard, courts will permit exculpatory
evidence to determine whether the executive has met the standard, but only
if such evidence directly undermines the reliability of the executive’s
evidence.153 In the present case, Padilla would only have the opportunity to
present evidence that undermines the executive’s Mobbs Declaration.154
The some evidence standard that the executive advocates is analogous to
the “scintilla of evidence” standard formerly used to defeat summary
judgment motions. By using the scintilla of evidence standard, the smallest
amount of evidence in opposition to the motion was sufficient to defeat it.155
Commentators severely criticized that standard because it predetermined
that summary judgment motions would be continually denied.156
Likewise, in the enemy combatant cases, the executive can virtually
always meet the some evidence standard.157 The Mobbs Declaration
supporting the executive’s assertion that a U.S. citizen is an enemy
combatant is some evidence and sufficient to withstand judicial review
under the new evidentiary standard, since the court is not scrutinizing the
facts contained in the declaration for accuracy.158 Masquerading as
meaningful judicial review, the some evidence standard the executive
advocates “would eviscerate the concept of independent judicial
scrutiny.”159
Careful analysis of the district court’s language in Padilla indicates that
Padilla’s access to counsel for presenting facts in the habeas proceeding was
essentially a façade.160 The court had already predetermined that the
executive’s designation of him as an enemy combatant would withstand
judicial review. By eliminating and manipulating procedural safeguards,
the court prevented Padilla from effectively developing and presenting his
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ongoing case. Most important, the district court predetermined that the
executive would prevail through the invocation of a practically nonexistent
standard. The court disingenuously granted Padilla limited access to
counsel to present facts in a case where it had already decided that Padilla
would lose. It did so in order to appear as though it was weighing the facts
and not deferring to the executive entirely. Nevertheless, although the
court’s adoption of the some evidence standard assured the executive’s
victory in Padilla, the executive’s subsequent overreaching cost it one of its
most ardent allies.
2. Motion for Reconsideration
Despite Judge Mukasey’s indication that the executive would prevail, on
January 9, 2003, the executive filed an untimely motion for reconsideration
of the district court’s order to allow Padilla limited access to counsel.161
Although the court ultimately granted the motion for reconsideration in
order to hear the executive’s recycled arguments, it adhered to its previous
ruling, writing a new opinion to chastise the executive for its duplicitous
procedural maneuvering.162
Ordinarily, motions for reconsideration are pro forma and dispensed with
quickly by the courts. Nevertheless, the executive’s procedurally and
substantively flawed motion for reconsideration and Judge Mukasey’s
strident response warrant discussion.163 Local Civil Rule 6.2, applicable to
motions for reconsideration, requires that “such motion be made within ten
days after determination of the original motion, and bars affidavits unless
authorized by the court.”164 The executive, however, filed its motion more
than one month after the original opinion and included the Jacoby
Declaration—an affidavit without the benefit of court order.165
Attacking the executive’s legal justification for filing an untimely motion
for reconsideration, Judge Mukasey, who earlier appeared solicitous toward
the executive, asserted that “[t]he government’s arguments . . . are
permeated with the pinched legalism one usually encounters from non-
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lawyers.”166 Most important, Judge Mukasey’s opinion addressed the
executive’s duplicity in ostensibly justifying Padilla’s continued detention
without counsel. In an inappropriate attempt to add to the record, the
executive submitted the Jacoby Declaration, implicitly conceding to the
insufficiency of the Mobbs Declaration.167 The Jacoby Declaration,
produced by an Admiral Jacoby, asserted that the court should not grant
Padilla access to counsel because the interrogators had created an
atmosphere of dependency and trust and access to counsel could disrupt that
relationship.168
Criticizing the highly speculative nature of the
169
declaration, Judge Mukasey highlighted the executive’s failure to provide
any facts or examples to justify the assertions.170
Judge Mukasey then addressed the executive’s argument that the district
court’s earlier adoption of the some evidence standard “moots any
requirement in the [habeas] statute that Padilla be heard.”171 According to
the executive, the some evidence standard requires courts only to consider
the facts known by the President, as set forth in the Mobbs Declaration, at
the time he designated Padilla an enemy combatant.172 The executive
maintained that any factual showing Padilla could produce (regardless of
whether it unequivocally proved that the executive’s designation of him is
incorrect) is “beside the point.”173
Even under the highly deferential some evidence standard, Judge
Mukasey maintained that he could not prohibit Padilla from presenting facts
to the court.174 Presentation of facts was necessary to confirm that Padilla
had not been arbitrarily detained.175 Furthermore, application of the some
evidence standard requires that Padilla be given an opportunity to respond
to the executive’s allegations because there had been no prior adversarial
proceedings allowing Padilla the opportunity to present his case. Judge
Mukasey stated, “No court of which I am aware has applied the ‘some
evidence’ standard to a record that consists solely of the government’s
evidence, to which the government’s adversary has not been permitted to
respond.”176
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In important respects, Judge Mukasey’s statements about Padilla’s need
and right to present evidence represent less than they initially appear. The
court indicated that its earlier ruling allowing Padilla access to counsel to
present facts to the court was a “pro forma requirement”177 to avoid the
appearance that it had dispensed with due process entirely. Coupled with
the court’s adoption of the some evidence standard, Judge Mukasey
suggested throughout the opinion that he had already predetermined the
executive would prevail in the habeas proceedings.178 The court therefore
admonished the executive for its overreaching in not allowing the court to
satisfy its pro forma due process requirement without affecting the ultimate
result.179
In its analysis of the precedent supporting the some evidence standard,
the court concluded that earlier prison disciplinary cases made it practicable
for petitioners to obtain exculpatory evidence against the government.180
Given the sensitive nature of Padilla’s case, however, the court suggested
that it would be more deferential to the executive in reviewing Padilla’s
evidence than past courts applying the some evidence standard had been:
Those cases which dealt with evaluation of evidence gathered in
the relatively accessible setting of a prison, cannot be applied
mechanically to evaluate evidence gathered in the chaotic and less
accessible setting of a distant battlefield. What allowances will
have to be made in the logic of those cases will have to abide
whatever submission Padilla may choose to make.181
Thus, only by allowing Padilla access to counsel under a some evidence
standard could it appear that the district court had not abdicated its judicial
role while still allowing the executive to prevail.
3. Petition for Interlocutory Appeal
In response to Judge Mukasey’s reaffirmation that the executive grant
Padilla limited access to counsel, the executive filed a motion for
interlocutory appeal with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.182 The
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executive, however, did not ask the court to certify questions regarding the
executive branch’s authority to designate U.S. citizens as enemy combatants
or the propriety of the some evidence standard. Rather, the executive only
challenged the district court’s initial ruling that Secretary Rumsfeld was the
proper respondent, and that the New York district court had jurisdiction to
hear the case.183
The executive’s challenge to the court’s jurisdiction appears to have been
part of its larger legal strategy to remove Padilla from the Second Circuit’s
jurisdiction. The record suggests the executive feared that the Second
Circuit, one of the more liberal circuits in the country, might rule that the
executive does not have the authority to unilaterally designate an American
citizen detained on U.S. soil an enemy combatant, or at a minimum that the
executive must produce more than some evidence to support the
designation.184
Since the Fourth Circuit exhibited extreme deference to the executive in
Hamdi, adjudicating Padilla in conservative South Carolina, where Fourth
Circuit law controls, might prove strategically advantageous. Thus, the
district court’s decision in South Carolina would most likely be in the
executive’s favor and on appeal, the case would go to the Fourth Circuit.
Given that court’s earlier reluctance to award Hamdi access to counsel, the
likelihood is that the Fourth Circuit would deny Padilla access as well,
notwithstanding its previous reluctance to proclaim any “broad or
categorical holdings.”185
Judge Mukasey’s order certifying the interlocutory appeal strongly
suggested that he understood and disagreed with the executive’s legal
strategy.186 In addition to certifying the two procedural questions the
executive submitted, Judge Mukasey certified sua sponte three substantive
questions: (1) whether the President has the authority to label American
citizens enemy combatants; (2) whether some evidence is the proper
evidentiary standard in assessing the designation; and (3) whether the
district court’s decision to grant Padilla limited access to counsel under the
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All Writs Act was proper.187 Thus, the executive’s failure to adhere to
Judge Mukasey’s initial ruling led to exactly what it appears the executive
was attempting to avoid—adjudication of the substantive merits by the
more liberal Second Circuit. At the same time, the executive succeeded in
bringing before the federal appellate court a highly deferential, if not
predeterminative, standard of judicial review of executive pronouncements
of national security.188

IV. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING NATIONAL SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES
As a means of defeating or (perhaps more aptly stated) avoiding
heightened scrutiny of actions that curtail civil liberties, the executive has
devised an artifice for extreme judicial deference. Using threshold
designations and a deferential evidentiary standard, the executive is
assuring that when courts reach the substantive issue—for example,
whether the executive has the authority to label an American citizen an
enemy combatant—the level of scrutiny is so low that the judiciary is
rubber-stamping the executive determination.189 Employing this novel
method ensures that courts will not exercise close judicial review and
permits the executive to further expand its power. Moreover, this method
of designation creates a safe haven; insulating courts from the type of
criticism the U.S. Supreme Court received after its World War II Japanese
American internment decisions where it pronounced strict scrutiny yet gave
extreme judicial deference to government excesses.
In light of the executive’s demand that courts defer to its national security
assertions, the following section will examine the judiciary’s historical role
in reviewing executive policy during times of ostensible national security
threats. The existing tensions, as to the level of judicial scrutiny courts
should apply to assert national security restrictions of fundamental liberties,
will also be explored. This section will then analyze a particular method for
selecting the appropriate standard of judicial review in the context of
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national security and civil liberty tensions. Using this method as a
foundation, the section will then offer a preliminary framework for courts to
apply in current national security civil liberties cases, particularly those that
employ threshold designations and procedural maneuvers in an attempt to
evade judicial review and public accountability. To demonstrate how the
framework would treat executive designations like enemy combatant, the
section will conclude by applying the framework to Hamdi and Padilla.
A. The Judiciary’s Historical Role in Reviewing Executive Policy During
Times of National Security Threats
Lurking beneath the surface of nearly every war powers and national
security decision is the question of what role, if any, the judiciary should
have in adjudging executive actions that restrict civil liberties.190 When the
executive advances arguments for minimal judicial scrutiny of its national
security measures, it is in essence saying that its constitutional liberty
restrictions warrant special deference because they are being undertaken
during exceptional circumstances. Conceding that although its actions
would not normally pass constitutional muster, the executive asserts that the
courts should ultimately legitimize its actions when there is a bona fide
threat to the nation’s security.191
The judiciary’s competence in scrutinizing national security claims has
long been debated. Two prevalent views have emerged to address the
federal judiciary’s role during times of national threat. The “interventionist
view” contends that in a constitutional democracy, the judiciary is best
positioned to safeguard constitutionally protected liberties from the tyranny
of the majority because it is insulated from the pressure of political
constituencies.192 Since federal judges are appointed for life, they are free
to render decisions based on the law, rather than on the whims of the public.
According to the interventionist view, the judiciary provides “watchful
care” over the rights of individuals,193 particularly during times of national
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threat or crisis when “fears and prejudices”194 are aroused and the system of
democracy is at its most vulnerable.195
The opposing “non-interventionist view” holds that decisions affecting
the liberties of individuals should be left to the majoritarian and politically
accountable executive and congressional branches.196 Implicit is the notion
that the judiciary should pay substantial deference to the executive and
congressional branches—particularly when their actions arise in the context
of national security threats.197 Under this rationale, the judiciary’s role is to
uphold the laws of the land, rather than take an active part in shaping
them.198 Broadly stated, if the executive or legislature oversteps the bounds
of its power, an informed electorate is later capable of checking government
excesses through the political process.199
For the political process to work, however, government actions must be
open for the American people to scrutinize. But what happens when the
American people do not know what their government is doing? If the
government has shrouded its actions from the public, how then can the
public provide the “ultimate check against an arbitrary government?”200 In
light of the recurring history of executive branch civil liberties abuses
during times of national stress,201 the question then emerges: when, not if,
the judiciary should intervene to protect fundamental liberties from
government actions in times of ostensible national security threats?
In practice, when a citizen’s fundamental liberties are at stake, some
courts have applied a heightened scrutiny analysis to determine whether the
government’s self-protective measures are legitimate. The court first
examines whether a bona fide threat to national security exists.202 If this
inquiry yields a positive answer, then the analysis turns to determining
whether the government’s means of securing the nation are the most
carefully tailored.203 The determination is essentially factual and commonly
left to the realm of the courts. However, some legal scholars, including
Chief Justice Rehnquist, argue that while the strict scrutiny analysis is
appropriate during times of peace, the judiciary should defer to the
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executive and legislative branches and attenuate the standard of review
during times of national security threat.204 These scholars contend that
during times of national crisis, there is sensitive information that the
judiciary, and thus, the public, should not be privy to for the sake of the
nation’s security.205 In response, other scholars reason that courts must
ensure that the government has compelling legal justification for its actions.
They point to the government’s historical misuse of national security
arguments to deprive specific groups of fundamental liberties in cases like
Korematsu.206
B. Ascertaining the Standard of Review in National Security Civil Liberties
Cases
To help resolve the debate of whether courts should apply heightened or
deferential scrutiny to national security civil liberty restrictions, in 1986
Professor Eric Yamamoto proposed a method for courts to determine the
appropriate standard of judicial review.207 Professor Yamamoto suggested,
“Except as to actions under civilly-declared martial law, the standard of
review of government restrictions of civil liberties of Americans [should]
not [be] altered or attenuated by the government’s contention that ‘military
necessity’ or ‘national security’ justifies the challenged restrictions.”208
Rather than deferring to the government’s national security assertions where
fundamental liberties are restricted, Professor Yamamoto advocated that
courts look at the government’s substantive claim and apply the heightened
standard of judicial review prescribed by ordinary constitutional doctrine
for non-national security cases.
While contending that the government’s national security claims should
not attenuate judicial review,209 Yamamoto recognized that national security
concerns would indeed be important “ingredients in the application of the
fixed constitutional calculus.”210 For example, if the Korematsu court had
employed Professor Yamamoto’s method, it would not have merely
pronounced strict scrutiny as the general standard to review the racial
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incarceration and then deferred to the government’s specific claim of
national security. Instead, the court would have strictly scrutinized the
government’s claim of Japanese American disloyalty, carefully examining
the factual basis for the claim, including the substantially falsified DeWitt
Report offered in support.211 If the government had declared martial law,
which it did not, or if fundamental liberties had not been implicated, which
they were, then the court would have been correct in fully deferring to the
government’s military necessity claim as it did.
C. Critiquing and Expanding the Method
Professor Yamamoto’s proposed method for determining the standard of
judicial review in national security cases appears workable in cases like
Korematsu, where the government grounded racial incarceration on
substantive claims of unlawful conduct—espionage and sabotage. The
method, however, did not contemplate apparent executive attempts to evade
heightened judicial scrutiny by using threshold designations, like enemy
combatant, and inapplicable evidentiary standards, like the some evidence
standard. Broadly applied, Professor Yamamoto’s method would not treat
the enemy combatant threshold designation as implicating a fundamental
liberty because that designation is preliminary to any chargeable substantive
claim of, for example, espionage, or sabotage. Strict scrutiny would not be
triggered until the substantive claim is raised, even though the ultimate
effect of the executive’s preliminary designation would be an impingement
on fundamental rights. Professor Yamamoto’s standard also presumed that
courts would review executive evidence under the proper evidentiary
standard. Therefore, his proposed method, which provides apt guidance in
many situations, requires expansion to accommodate new developments
such as the executive’s use of threshold designations and inapplicable,
highly deferential evidentiary standards.
Given the current ambiguity and the number of cases challenging
executive actions arising out of America’s “war on terror,”212 numerous
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judges and legal practitioners have observed that a workable framework of
judicial review is needed.213 The following section suggests a two-tiered
framework for reviewing national security civil liberty restrictions,
particularly those that employ a “threshold designation method” to avert
heightened judicial scrutiny. More specifically, the first tier builds upon
Professor Yamamoto’s approach for determining the appropriate level of
judicial scrutiny by examining whether, according to law and facts,
heightened judicial scrutiny of executive national security civil liberty
restrictions is appropriate. Where heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate, the second tier articulates the executive’s burden of evidentiary
proof.
1. The “Threshold Designation Method” for Averting Heightened
Judicial Scrutiny
In response to scholars’ and historians’ harsh criticism of the Court’s
duplicity in Korematsu,214 the executive has devised a novel method to
escape judicial review. The executive has created new threshold designations—such as “enemy combatant,” “material witness,” and “special
interest”—that precede substantive determinations and are immune from
heightened judicial scrutiny when applied by the executive for national
security reasons. As prominent federal judges have recognized, the
executive has devised a method “to do indirectly what it cannot do
directly.”215
A threshold designation appears to differ from an explicit racial directive,
such as the military internment orders in Korematsu. The designation also
appears to serve process goals in the interest of national security, such as
holding potential terrorists pending investigation or shielding sensitive
national security information from the public eye.216 The executive,
therefore, contends that courts should not scrutinize a preliminary and
discretionary designation because the executive has not yet made the
substantive determination as to whether the person is actually dangerous;
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for example, whether an “enemy combatant” is actually engaged in terrorist
activity.217 Yet, by making the threshold designation, the executive is in
fact depriving the designated individual of fundamental liberties and is
treating him as “guilty” of disloyalty.
When the government labels a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant, it is in
essence stripping the individual of all constitutional rights. For example, if
the government charged Hamdi or Padilla as a criminal, certain fundamental
liberties would be implicated. The individuals would have a Sixth
Amendment right to confer with counsel in an unmonitored setting. In
addition to presenting facts to a court, access to counsel includes conducting
discovery, knowing the evidence, having the ability to rebut the evidence,
and cross-examining witnesses. The Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
clause would also apply, requiring adequate protection to ensure
government interrogation conforms to the dictates of the privilege.218 Most
important, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would apply,
forbidding the government from depriving any American of life, liberty, or
property “without due process of law.”219
By designating U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, however, important
constitutional liberties are rendered moot. As currently applied, the
designation does not mean that U.S. citizens will receive even a scaled
down version of these liberties as Quirin suggested. It means that they will
not receive them at all. They will not be criminally charged because,
according to the executive, they are not criminals.220 They will not be tried
because the purpose of their enemy combatant designation is not to punish
or deter them, but rather to prevent them from rejoining the enemy pending
investigation, even though there is no proof they are allied with the
enemy.221 Stripped of fundamental liberties, they will be held indefinitely
in legal limbo until the executive decides it no longer wants to hold them.
Coupled with the highly deferential some evidence standard the executive is
advocating, meaningful judicial review is eviscerated.222 Absent any
meaningful judicial review, what then would stop the government from
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designating, for example, all Arab Americans in an area as enemy
combatants, and thereby stripping them of civil liberties? The government
could create de facto a new internment, once again shielded from judicial
review.
2. Proposed National Security Civil Liberties Framework of Judicial
Review
In order to account for the executive’s attempt to subterfuge heightened
scrutiny, the following section provides a preliminary sketch for a twotiered framework of judicial review of national security civil liberties
restrictions that would first scrutinize the executive’s threshold designation,
then closely examine the executive’s evidentiary proof.
Under the first tier of the framework, judicial review would focus on the
executive’s preliminary threshold designation to determine its implications.
For example, when the executive designates a U.S. citizen an enemy
combatant, heightened judicial scrutiny would be triggered where it appears
that the designation results in depriving the individual of fundamental
liberties, such as the lack of a hearing or access to counsel.223 Next, courts
would look to legal precedent to determine whether, as a matter of law, the
executive has the authority to label U.S. citizens enemy combatants and to
deprive them of specific fundamental liberties, such as access to counsel
and habeas procedings during exigent circumstances.224 If so, courts would
apply heightened scrutiny to determine whether current circumstances
warrant similar extreme measures and whether the means are appropriately
tailored.225
If the executive’s national security civil liberty restriction withstood the
first level of judicial scrutiny, courts would proceed to the second tier of
analysis that focuses on the burden of proof the executive must meet in
order to deprive the individual of fundamental liberties. Given the often
complex nature of the legal system, the analysis presupposes that the
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individual would have access to counsel to assist in the presentation of
evidence.
In the second level of analysis, the designated individual would be
apprised of the executive’s evidence against him. In addition, the individual
could conduct discovery and cross-examine the executive’s witnesses.
Courts would then examine the evidence the executive offers to sustain its
designation of the individual, such as the Mobbs Declaration, alongside the
individual’s evidence. When warranted by seemingly legitimate national
security concerns, courts could review executive evidence under seal or in
camera. In addition, parties to the litigation could be subject to carefully
tailored gag orders.
Next, to the extent practicable, courts would assess the reliability of both
the executive’s and the individual’s evidence. Assessing the reliability of
the evidence would include focusing on the means either party used to
obtain it, whether the evidence is hearsay, and if so, allowing challenges to
the reliability through witness testimony, or if unavailable, through
affidavit. Then, courts would hear full arguments by both sides. Finally, in
light of the liberty interests at stake, courts would review the evidence, at a
minimum, under a clear and convincing standard.226
This proposed framework of judicial review advocates a significantly
higher level of judicial scrutiny than that applied by Judge Wilkinson in
Hamdi or Judge Mukasey in Padilla. Despite the executive’s ostensible
claims of a national security threat, the substantial deprivation of American
liberty and imminent harm to the Constitution warrants nothing less.
3. The Threshold Designation Method in Other Situations
The threshold designation method is not limited to enemy combatants.
The executive has utilized the method in other national security situations to
abolish or severely limit judicial review. For example, of the 1,200 Arab
and Muslim noncitizens detained post-September 11, many were initially
held as material witnesses pending criminal investigations of others
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involved in the attacks.227 The executive, however, used the material
witness statute for another purpose—as a threshold discretionary
designation to detain noncitizens, without evidence of wrongdoing, while
investigating those particular individuals. The executive was not actually
holding these individuals so they could testify in ongoing criminal
proceedings as statutorily required.228 Because the executive did not
criminally charge the individuals, the threshold material witness designation
was shielded from judicial scrutiny; the executive implied it was simply
holding the aliens in order to secure their possible testimony about terrorism
and was not punishing them for in fact being terrorists.229
In actuality, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) first
detained noncitizens as material witnesses on improper grounds pending its
terror investigation of those individuals.230 The INS then used the detention
to uncover minor immigration violations and initiate often secret
deportation proceedings unconnected to terrorism.231 According to a
Human Rights Watch report, “many of the detainees were never required to
testify in court proceedings, their depositions were not sought to secure
their testimony, raising serious doubts about the legitimacy of the
government’s assertions that they were held as material witnesses.”232
The executive utilized the material witness threshold designation to avoid
judicial scrutiny of its blanket detention of noncitizens while it investigated
them, even though the executive lacked evidence connecting them to
terrorism.233 The executive resorted to this subterfuge, it appears, because
the USA PATRIOT Act requires the government to charge detained
noncitizens with criminal wrongdoing within seven days or release them.234
Yet, by detaining noncitizens as material witnesses, ostensibly to secure
their possible testimony in grand jury proceedings, the executive
circumvented legislative safeguards that prohibit indefinite detention of
noncitizens absent criminal charges. The outcome of this executive
maneuver was first detention and then, upon finding no connection to
terrorist activity, deportation for minor immigration violations adjudicated
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in secret “special interest” proceedings. The cumulative effect was the
misuse of the material witness designation to excise unwanted groups of
individuals from the country.235
As with enemy combatants, by not charging material witness detainees
with a crime, the executive could assert that constitutional liberties were not
implicated and that courts should therefore avoid closely scrutinizing the
threshold designation. But the ultimate effect of the threshold material
witness designation was to deprive the individual of fundamental liberties—
often through prolonged detention under horrendous prison conditions
without probable cause, charges, or trial.236 Under these circumstances, and
consistent with the national security civil liberties framework of judicial
review, future courts should exercise heightened scrutiny of threshold
material witness designations to prevent the illegitimate deprivation of
fundamental liberties.237
In a variation of the threshold designation method, the executive closed
deportation hearings of Arabs and Muslims it contended were “suspected
terrorists” en masse, limiting judicial review by designating the cases
“special interest.”238 By denying noncitizens the fundamental right to open
proceedings in the absence of individualized determinations that they posed
national security threats, the designation created a presumption of the
noncitizens’ guilt.239 Furthermore, this blanket closing injured the public
because potential government malfeasance was shielded from accountability.240
Despite over one hundred years of open proceedings, INS regulations,
and numerous court rulings recognizing a presumption of openness, the
executive contended that there is no history of open deportation proceedings
and therefore no First Amendment right of public access.241 The effect of
applying the executive’s method was that courts would review whether the
executive could close deportation hearings en masse by labeling them
“special interest” under rational basis analysis, thereby assuring the
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executive’s victory in most cases, and shielding its actions from public
accountability.242
Although the fundamental liberty implicated differs from the enemy
combatant and material witness examples, the method is essentially the
same. In using the threshold designation special interest to close deportation proceedings, the effect was to limit judicial scrutiny by attenuating
the standard of review. Although designating a case as special interest did
not directly affect the substantive outcome of whether the alien was
deportable, closing public access allowed the executive to secretly, and
perhaps wrongfully, target individuals for deportation absent judicial review
and public accountability. As the Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press
recognized:
There seems to be no limit to the Government’s argument. . . . By
the simple assertion of ‘national security,’ the Government seeks a
process where it may, without review, designate certain classes of
cases as ‘special interest’ and, behind closed doors, adjudicate the
merits of these cases to deprive noncitizens of their fundamental
liberties.243
In applying the proposed framework of judicial review to assure the
proper balance between national security and civil liberties concerns, courts
would first scrutinize the threshold special interest designation. If the effect
were to deprive the noncitizen or the press on the public’s behalf of
fundamental liberties, then courts would review the executive’s rationale
and supporting evidence for the threshold designation under heightened
scrutiny to determine if the national security interests are genuine and
compelling, and if the restrictions are appropriately tailored.
Meaningful review when a fundamental liberty is at stake will not only
prevent the politically powerless from being swept up in the tide of public
opinion, but it will also assure that the judiciary is not rubber-stamping
executive actions.244 It will guarantee that the system of checks and
balances functions properly and that any one branch is not gaining
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excessive power.245 The courts’ role would not be expanded, because
heightened scrutiny would only be applied in the same situations that it is
applied today. If the situation in the country becomes so ominous that the
government must truly restrict civil liberties in the name of national
security, as Professor Yamamoto has suggested, then it can declare martial
law.246
By maintaining heightened review absent martial law, targeted
individuals and the public are assured that the threat the government is
asserting is real and imminent. By delineating the standard courts will
apply to government actions ostensibly justified by national security, the
executive and the legislature will know the bounds of their power and what
type of justification is demanded when enacting laws to combat threats to
the nation’s safety. Americans will be on notice as to exactly what rights
they have during times of perceived crisis. Given that current courts are
applying conflicting standards of judicial and evidentiary review when
scrutinizing national security cases,247 courts will have workable guiding
principles in determining how much deference to give the political branches
when adjudicating cases that restrict our most fundamental of liberties.
Finally, clear standards will decrease inconsistent district and circuit court
rulings and ultimately provide predictability within the legal system.
By recognizing that national security assertions are “ingredients in the
constitutional calculus,”248 the judiciary will not likely undermine legitimate
executive efforts to safeguard the nation’s institutions. Rather than
disregard such assertions, the judiciary will carefully examine the basis for
the executive’s position and meaningfully review the evidence it offers to
substantiate it. Using judicially accepted methods with due concern for
confidentiality, such as reviewing executive evidence in camera, courts can
decipher whether executive assertions are warranted.249 Courts would
neither be involved in military and foreign policy decisions nor would they
be assessing the execution of America’s war on terror. They would merely
be assuring that when “troublesome times arise” and our “rulers . . . seek by
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sharp and decisive means to accomplish ends deemed just and proper . . .
that the principles of constitutional liberty” are not in peril.250 By not giving
the executive carte blanche in such matters, courts are assured that there is
in fact justification for the executive’s position. Most important, courts are
assured that they are not repeating the same mistakes of the Korematsu
Court.251
D. Expanded Framework Applied: Hamdi and Padilla
This section applies the national security civil liberties framework of
judicial review to specific national security cases. As stated above, the
framework applies two tiers of analysis.252 In the first tier of analysis, for
example, courts would examine the executive’s enemy combatant threshold
designation. If the designation’s effect was to deprive the individual of
fundamental liberties, heightened judicial scrutiny would be triggered and
courts would then turn to applicable legal precedent to determine whether,
as a matter of law, the executive has the authority to designate U.S. citizens
as enemy combatants. If courts determined that the executive does have
such authority, then courts would review the executive’s use of the enemy
combatant designation within the current national security context to
determine if the security interest is genuine and compelling and the means
are appropriately tailored.
If the executive’s enemy combatant designation withstood the first level
of heightened review, courts would proceed to the second tier. In this level,
the analysis would focus on the executive’s evidentiary burden in
designating specific individuals as enemy combatants. The executive
would be required to produce the evidence it relied upon in making its
determination, which the designated individual would be entitled to
meaningfully rebut. Courts would hear full legal arguments from both sides
and would review all the evidence under a clear and convincing evidentiary
standard.
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1. First Tier of Analysis
In applying the national security civil liberties framework to Hamdi and
Padilla, the first step is to examine the enemy combatant designation itself.
What are its implications? Does the threshold designation itself significantly restrict fundamental liberties? Does the designation appear to be an
artifice for avoiding heightened judicial scrutiny on the ostensible grounds
that the ultimate government action is still pending? In Hamdi and Padilla,
the implication of the executive’s threshold enemy combatant designation
of the defendants is indefinite detention, absent fundamental liberties,
pending investigation to determine substantive wrongdoing.
Once
designated enemy combatants, Hamdi and Padilla lost the rights to counsel,
trial, and judicial review. However, the executive maintained that because
they were not yet charged as criminals, they had no fundamental liberties,
and heightened judicial scrutiny should not apply.
In applying the framework, the executive’s denial of their criminal status
is not determinative, because the framework requires courts to look at the
effect the enemy combatant designation has on the individual. Calling
Hamdi or Padilla criminals or enemy combatants is irrelevant to whether
courts should apply heightened judicial scrutiny, since the effect of the
executive’s threshold enemy combatant designation is to incarcerate them
indefinitely, in solitary confinement, and without access to counsel.
Therefore, being labeled an enemy combatant becomes worse than being
charged as a criminal. According to the executive, the latter has far more
rights than an enemy combatant. Furthermore, by contending that these
individuals are allied with Al Qaeda and that the purpose of their detention
is to prevent them from rejoining the enemy, the executive has in reality
concluded that they are, at a minimum, guilty of supporting a terrorist
organization. In the present cases, fundamental liberties are implicated,
notwithstanding that Hamdi and Padilla are not charged as criminals. Thus,
heightened judicial scrutiny is triggered to determine whether, as a matter of
law, the executive has the authority to detain Hamdi or Padilla.

CIVIL LIBERTIES POST-SEPTEMBER 11

Judicial Scrutiny of National Security 167

The framework then looks to legal precedent to determine whether courts
have historically permitted similar deprivation of liberties in other exigent
circumstances. Today, the executive cites primarily to the World War II
case Quirin, which first employed the term enemy combatant, as its primary
source of authority for indefinitely detaining Hamdi and Padilla and
depriving them of fundamental liberties. As previously discussed, however,
Quirin does not stand for the proposition that the executive can unilaterally
declare a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant and then indefinitely detain the
individual without charges, access to counsel or judicial review.253 In
Quirin, there was no question that the designated individuals were indeed
enemy combatants. Therefore, the case did not hold that the executive
could unilaterally label a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant. To the contrary,
the high court recognized that even in times of war judicial scrutiny is
necessary. Finally, the enemy combatants had access to counsel, were
charged, tried, and convicted before they were punished. Thus, Quirin
stands solely for the proposition that the executive can try a U.S. citizen as
an enemy combatant in a military tribunal, notwithstanding that the civil
courts are open. Even District Judge Mukasey in Padilla recognized that
Quirin does not offer the “proper precedential value for the government’s
determination.”254
Applying the first tier of the framework to the executive’s enemy
combatant designation, therefore, reveals that the effect of the threshold
designation is to deprive the individual of fundamental liberties,
notwithstanding that the individual is not charged as a criminal or terrorist.
If no other supporting legal precedent exists, the enemy combatant
designation fails as a matter of law. However, should courts discover legal
precedent to support the designation, the framework requires courts to
review the executive’s rationale under heightened judicial scrutiny. Courts
will thereby determine the legitimacy of the asserted national security
justification for designating U.S. citizens as enemy combatants. Next,
courts would consider whether the executive’s means are the most
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appropriately tailored means to accomplish its purpose. In assessing the
legitimacy of the designation, as District Judge Doumar established in
Hamdi, courts must scrutinize factors such as the executive’s basis for
designating the individual an enemy combatant, the screening criteria used,
and the national security purpose the individual’s continued detention
serves.255
2. Second Tier of Analysis
If the executive’s enemy combatant designation withstood the first tier,
courts would proceed to the second tier of analysis. In this level, the focus
shifts to the designated individual, who would be afforded full access to
counsel. Courts would also permit Hamdi and Padilla to present evidence
to counter the Mobbs Declaration. In addition to presenting facts, Hamdi
and Padilla would be permitted to conduct discovery in order to
meaningfully rebut the executive’s evidence.
Next, to the extent practicable, courts would assess the reliability of the
executive’s evidence alongside Hamdi and Padilla’s evidence. Courts
would begin by addressing the hearsay-laden nature of the Mobbs
Declaration. The executive would be required to respond to claims, such as
that Special Adviser Mobbs lacked personal knowledge in producing the
Mobbs Declaration. In Hamdi’s case, the courts would focus on the
allegations that Northern Alliance forces, responsible for Hamdi’s alleged
capture, were paid bounties to capture Taliban prisoners and that many of
the prisoners the Northern Alliance forces captured were wrongfully
accused.256 In Padilla’s case, courts would focus on the apparent inconsistencies between Secretary Rumsfeld’s initial statements, in which he
accused Padilla of being a terrorist with plans to detonate a “dirty bomb,”
and subsequent reports by the Deputy Secretary of Defense that “there
wasn’t really a plan.”257
In addition, courts would consider allegations by the executive that
Padilla is being detained solely for interrogation purposes and to prevent
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him from rejoining the enemy. Hamdi and Padilla would be permitted to
present witnesses to rebut the executive’s Mobbs Declaration, as well as
cross-examine the executive’s witnesses. Courts would review evidence
from both sides, under seal or in camera, if necessary, including the
sufficiency of the Mobbs Declaration, standing alone, as justification for
designating an American citizen an enemy combatant. Finally, courts
would hear full arguments on both sides and review the evidence, at a
minimum, under a clear and convincing standard.
In Hamdi and Padilla, the executive maintained that courts should review
the threshold enemy combatant designation under the some evidence
standard. As previously discussed, the effect of adopting the some evidence
standard is to guarantee the executive will prevail, because courts are not
scrutinizing the executive’s supporting evidence to determine its probity.
The framework would require courts to reject new and inapplicable
evidentiary standards, such as the some evidence standard.
Moreover, in applying the framework, courts would not apply a
deferential zone of active combat test as the Fourth Circuit did in Hamdi, in
lieu of meaningfully reviewing the executive’s supporting evidence. The
executive’s “national security” assertions would also not attenuate the
standard of judicial review of the executive’s threshold designations and
supporting evidence. Were future courts to agree with Fourth Circuit Judge
Wilkinson’s assertions in Hamdi that the executive’s national security
decisions are accorded full deference, and therefore immune from
heightened scrutiny,258 the executive could assert national security as a
justification at any time it wanted to speciously target individuals and
“deprive [them] of fundamental liberties.”259 Assured that courts would
defer, and its restrictions would withstand—or not undergo—judicial
scrutiny, the executive could once again legally target groups on account of
race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, or political opinion without
accountability. District Judge Doumar in Hamdi recognized this danger and
the significance of meaningful judicial scrutiny.
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While it is clear that the executive is entitled to deference
regarding military designations of individuals, it is equally clear
that the judiciary is entitled to a meaningful judicial review of
those designations when they substantially infringe on the
individual liberties, guaranteed by the United States Constitution,
of American citizens. . . . The standard of judicial inquiry must
also recognize that the concept of ‘national defense’ cannot be
deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of [executive]
power designed to promote such a goal. Implicit in the term
‘national defense’ is the notion of defending those values and
ideals which sets this Nation apart. . . . It would indeed be ironic if,
in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion
of one of those liberties . . . which makes the defense of the nation
worthwhile.”260
For similar reasons, the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan observed that
during times of commotion, “when passions of men are aroused and the
restraints of law weakened,”261 rather than defer to claims of national
security, the judiciary should intervene and provide “watchful care”262 over
cherished constitutional liberties.
The above analysis of Hamdi and Padilla, therefore, suggests that the
executive’s sole evidence in support of its threshold designation of Hamdi
and Padilla as enemy combatants, the conclusory Mobbs Declaration that
relied primarily on hearsay, would be insufficient to support their indefinite
detention absent further evidence and criminal charges. Without additional
proof to justify their continued detention as enemy combatants, the
executive’s threshold enemy combatant designation of Hamdi and Padilla
would fail according to the national security civil liberty framework of
judicial review.263

V. CONCLUSION: REFRAMING JUDICIAL SCRUTINY—NATIONAL
SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
In Korematsu, the Supreme Court first pronounced that it would strictly
scrutinize the Japanese American exclusion orders and then deferred
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entirely to the government’s national security and military necessity
assertions. As a result, that Court has been severely criticized for its
pronouncement of strict scrutiny in principle and for its extreme deference
to governmental excesses in fact.264 To similar criticism of judicial
hypocrisy, courts today are practicing a new form of deference.
If the courts permit the executive to create labels that strip Americans of
fundamental liberties, the courts would be once again abdicating their role
of “watchful care.”265 Executive threshold designations like enemy
combatant, material witness, and special interest appear to be little more
than a method for circumventing constitutional protections.
The
designations also create a way for a potentially deferential judiciary to
review excesses of executive power using standards that masquerade as
meaningful judicial review but that actually predetermine executive success.
By allowing the executive to deploy a new framework of analysis and by
alluding to ostensible precedent to support the executive’s unilateral
threshold designations, the judiciary would threaten to undermine the very
liberty the war on terror seeks to protect. This assault on the Constitution
would have real and resounding impact as lives are ruined. If the
Constitution does not stand for the principle that the executive cannot, at its
word, deprive individuals of their freedom, then the document Americans
cherish means little.
As the executive continues to expand its reach into the personal lives of
all Americans, heightened judicial scrutiny is imperative. For if the
judiciary does not demand justification of current civil liberty restrictions,
no branch of government will. Today, the judiciary needs to be the final
arbiter and protector of fundamental liberties of citizens and noncitizens
alike. If it abdicates this role, as it did in Korematsu, then the very
democratic foundation of the country is at risk. If the executive’s expansive
authority over American civil liberties is not checked, the excesses of today
will haunt us tomorrow.

VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 1 • 2003

172 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

The executive needs to explain its basis for detaining someone as an
enemy combatant.266 It should explain what procedures it will employ to
ensure that these detentions are consistent with “due process, American
tradition and international law.”267 It should ensure that detainees have
access to counsel and that whatever actions it takes when the civil courts are
open are subject to careful judicial review.268
As revealed in Section IV, the executive is seeking to avoid judicial
review and therefore public accountability. The national security civil
liberties framework of judicial review, proposed here, demonstrates that in
precisely these circumstances, it is the judiciary that must ensure executive
adherence to constitutional standards. Today, as in Korematsu, the judiciary must intervene and “exercise authority to protect all citizens from the
petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused.”269
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the sources are of dubious credibility. In citing interviews with two individuals, Mobbs
explained the following:
It is believed that these confidential sources have not been completely candid
about their association with Al Qaeda and their terrorist activities. Much of
the information from these sources has, however, been corroborated and
proven accurate and reliable. Some information provided by sources remains
uncorroborated and may be part of an effort to mislead or confuse U.S.
officials. One of the sources, for example, in a subsequent interview with a
U.S. law enforcement official recanted some of the information that he has
provided, but most of this information has been independently corroborated by
other sources. In addition, at the time of being interviews by U.S. officials,
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one of the sources was being treated with various types of drugs to treat
medical conditions.
Unclassified Mobbs Decl., at ¶ 3, n.1 (emphasis added).
36
See Section IV(C)(1) infra. As a result of the executive and military orders resulting
in the deprivation of Japanese Americans’ fundamental liberties in Korematsu, Congress
passed 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) to ensure that the executive could never again detain
American citizens under the mantle of national security and military necessity absent
specific legislative authorization. The statute states, “No citizen shall be detained by the
United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). According
to The Cato Institute et al.:
By this language, Congress made clear that henceforth, congressional silence
should no longer be construed as acquiescence in unauthorized executive
detentions. Congress passed § 4001(a) to avoid exactly what has happened [in
the enemy combatant cases]: statutorily groundless detention of . . .
American[s] justified by the Executive’s talismanic invocation of the terms
“enemy combatant” and “national security.”
Brief of Amici Curiae The Cato Institute et al. at 4, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d
218 (S.D.N.Y 2003), appeal docketed, No. 03-2235 (2nd Cir. June 10, 2003).
To justify its unconstitutional detention of Hamdi and Padilla despite the § 4001(a)
restriction, the executive is currently contending that the “Authorization of Military
Force” (“AUMF”) resolution passed after September 11, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001), and an appropriations statute for the Department of Defense, 10 U.S.C.
§ 956(5) (2002), constitute congressional authorization for the indefinite detention of
American citizens as enemy combatants. Brief of Amici Curiae The Cato Institute et al.
at 4, Padilla (No. 03-2235). Although the author believes that based specifically on
§ 4001(a), the executive branch likely lacks statutory authority to detain American
citizens as enemy combatants, the issue is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses
on the executive’s ostensible constitutional authority.
37
Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283 (“with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen
alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges of
counsel on the government’s say-so”).
38
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
39
See Section IV(A)(2) and (3) infra.
40
Id.
41
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460.
42
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 564.
43
The enemy combatant designation is not limited to Hamdi and Padilla. The executive
also labeled “American Taliban,” John Walker Lindh an enemy combatant. United States
v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545 (2002). However, the executive charged Lindh, a
white American, as a criminal, and Lindh received the full panoply of Constitutional
protections, including the right to counsel and presentation of evidence. Following
capture and interrogation by U.S. forces, the executive charged Lindh in a ten count
indictment alleging, inter alia, (1) conspiracy to murder nationals of the United States,
including American military personnel and other government employees serving in
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Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, attacks; (2) conspiracy to provide
material support to a foreign terrorist organization; (3) conspiracy to provide material
support and resources to Al Qaeda; and (4) contributing service to Al Qaeda. Lindh
simply could not have a change in venue. Id. at 547–48.
In addition, the executive has also labeled Qatari national Ali Saleh Kahalh al-Marri
an enemy combatant, and according to reports, the executive is detaining him in the same
South Carolina facilities where Hamdi and Padilla are held. See Al Marri v. Bush, 274 F.
Supp. 2d 1003, 1004 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (dismissing habeas petition for improper venue after
criminal charges were dismissed and petitioner declared an enemy combatant and moved
to South Carolina). Furthermore, the numerous noncitizen prisoners the executive has
detained at Camp X-Ray, Guantanamo Bay since the conflict in Afghanistan began have
also been labeled enemy combatants and therefore ineligible for the protections of the
Geneva Convention. Editorial, Wronged at Guantanamo, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25,
2003, at A14.
Indicating an intention to label additional American citizens enemy combatants, the
executive has erected a special facility in South Carolina designed to hold citizens
designated “enemy combatants.” Jess Bravin, More Terror Suspects May Sit in Limbo,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2002, at A4.
44
On interlocutory appeal, Judge Wilkinson maintained that the Fourth Circuit had
“already emphasized that the standard of review of enemy combatant detentions must be
a deferential one when the detainee was captured abroad in a zone of combat operations.”
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 471–72. Similarly, Judge Mukasey explained that deference to the
President “extends to military designations of individuals as enemy combatants in times
of active hostilities, as well as to their detention after capture on the field of battle.”
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 606; But see Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 535. (Judge Doumar
refused to “rubber-stamp” the executive’s enemy combatant designation of Hamdi and
proceeded to strictly scrutinize the Mobb’s Declaration that the executive used to support
its position); See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 373 (4th Cir. 2003), (rehearing
en banc denied) (sharply criticizing the Fourth Circuit panel’s reasoning as “dizzingly
circular” arguing the panel’s review of Hamdi’s case did not “constitute the ‘meaningful
judicial review’ the panel promised”) (Motz, J., dissenting).
45
See Part III(A) infra.
46
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 5. (“Although the Executive will not cite it, the only
precedent in this nation’s history for the prolonged detention of American citizens with
so little due process is the discredited decision in Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214. Unless the
courts are now to become rubber-stamps for executive overreaching, the government’s
position must be rejected.”)
47
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
48
Id. at 10.
49
Id. at 11.
50
Id. at 39.
51
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (holding that U.S. citizens cannot be tried in a
military tribunal when the civil courts are open).
52
Quirin, 317 U.S at 20.
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53

Id. at 20.
Id. at 19.
55
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 16. (“Before September 11, 2001, the phrase ‘enemy
combatant’ appeared only in a handful of court decisions, none of which support the
Executive’s refusal to grant Padilla access to counsel or to provide with a meaningful
adversarial hearing on his status.”). In cases where the government might be termed
“enemy combatants,” defendants were provided with counsel. Id. at 17, citing In re
Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946) (defendant afforded access to counsel and permitted
to present evidence at habeas trial in federal court) and In re Application of Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1 (1946) (reaching the U.S. Supreme Court after overseas trial in which
Yamashita was afforded six defense counsel). As in Quirin, the individuals detained in
these cases were afforded access to counsel and a formal hearing on the record. Thus,
none of these cases “remotely support the government’s position that [enemy
combatants] may be detained indefinitely without access to counsel and without any sort
of adversarial trial with the accoutrements of due process.” Gibbons Brief, supra note 10,
at 17.
56
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 12.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 31.
59
See Part IV(B) and (C) infra.
60
See Section IV(A)(2) and (3) infra.
61
See Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 17 (“The Quirin defendants were given lawyers,
informed of the charges against them, and allowed to present evidence on their behalf at a
formal hearing. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court on habeas, the facts
were longer in dispute.”).
In fact the Supreme Court has never held that a person designated by the
Executive as an enemy combatant cannot challenge that designation or that a
court cannot require the Executive to substantiate it. In the case on which the
majority relies, Ex parte Quirin, the Court did not hold that for a violation of the
laws of war, even an American citizen could be treated as an “enemy
combatant” and held without the full array of Constitutional rights, but only
because the citizen, after consultation with legal counsel, stipulated to the facts
supporting the enemy combatant designation.
Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 369–70 (Motz, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
62
In Hamdi, Judge Wilkinson explained,
As an American citizen, Hamdi would be entitled to the due process
protections normally found in the criminal justice system, including the right
to meet with counsel, if he had been charged with a crime. But as we have
pointed out, Hamdi has not been charged with any crime. He is being held as
an enemy combatant pursuant to well-established laws and customs of war.
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 475. Similarly, in Padilla, Judge Mukasey contended that Padilla’s
detention is not punitive:
Padilla is not being detained by the military in order to execute a civilian law,
notwithstanding that his alleged conduct may in fact violate one or more such
54
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laws. He is being detained in order to interrogate him about the unlawful
organization with which he is said to be affiliated and with which the military
is in active conduct, and to prevent him from becoming reaffiliated with that
organization.
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
63
Id.; Respondents’ Response to District Court’s October 21, 2002 Order at 2, Padilla v.
Bush No. 02 Civ. 4445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Respondents’ Response] (“Padilla
has no right to counsel because he is being detained solely as an enemy combatant during
wartime, not for any criminal or other punitive purposes”).
64
In a revealing memo to the Department of Defense, whose contents were leaked to
USA Today, Secretary Rumsfeld conceded that winning the war on terror would be “a
long, hard slog.” American citizens are facing potentially lifetime detention without
significant judicial review. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that these “enemy
combatants” may remain in detention “for the duration of the conflict,” a conflict he
defined as ending “when we feel that there are not effective global terrorist networks war
on terrorism is therefore permanent functioning in the world.” Thom Shanker, Rumsfeld
Sees Need to Realign Military Fight Against Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A12.
65
According to the executive,
the detention of all enemy combatants in wartime, serves two critical purposes
related to the conduct of war: It prevents him [sic] from continuing to aid the
enemy in executing attacks against the United States, and it assists the military
in gathering the intelligence necessary to effectively execute the war.
Accordingly, his detention is no sense “criminal,” and it has no penal
consequences whatsoever.
Respondent’s Response to the District Court’s October 21, 2002 Order, Padilla v. Bush at
5-6 (Oct. 28, 2002) No. 02 Civ. 4445 (MBM) at 2-3 [hereinafter, Respondent’s
Response]. Secretary Rumsfeld has stated, “we are not interested in punishing” them, but
in “finding out” what they know. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
66
Respondent’s Response, supra note 65, at 13-14.; Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468; Padilla,
233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95.
67
See generally Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that unlawful belligerents did not
have a constitutional right to a civil trial by jury but instead could be tried in a military
tribunal without a jury); Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 17; Respondents’ Response,
supra note 65, at 13-14; Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-595.
68
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
69
Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 372. According to dissenting Fourth Circuit Judge Motz:
The ramifications of such a holding are chilling. Pursuant to the panel’s
decision, for example, any of the “embedded” American journalists covering
the war in Iraq or any member of a humanitarian organization working in
Afghanistan, could be imprisoned indefinitely without being charged with a
crime or provided access to counsel if the Executive designated that person an
“enemy combatant.”
Id.
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70

Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 3 (“the federal courts must have meaningful authority
to make an independent evaluation whether a person is properly being held”). Brief of
American Bar Ass’n at 12, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y 2003),
appeal docketed, No. 03-2235 (2nd Cir. June 10, 2003) [hereininafter ABA Brief] (“these
general principles of deference in a military setting should not prevent the court from
engaging in meaningful review of the government’s decision to detain Padilla.”); Hamdi,
337 F.3d at 375 (“Under our Constitution…it is the responsibility of the courts to ensure
that American citizens are not deprived of liberty without due process of law, regardless
of the personal belief of any individual judge concerning the integrity of the Executive”)
(Motz, J., dissenting).
71
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 6.
72
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 3.
73
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460.
74
Id.
75
Recent reports indicate that Hamdi has been moved from Norfolk, Virginia to a brig in
Charleston, South Carolina where the government has apparently erected a facility to
hold American citizens designated enemy combatants. U.S. Man Caught with Taliban Is
Moved to Brig, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, at 16; Jess Bravin, More Terror Suspects
May Sit in Limbo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2002, at A4.
76
Hamdi’s habeas petition was submitted by his father acting as “next friend.” Hamdi,
316 F.3d at 460.
77
Id.
78
Id. As this article was going to press, on December 2, 2003, the Department of
Defense (DOD) announced that Mr. Hamdi will be allowed limited access to a lawyer
subject to government-determined security restrictions. DOD New Release No. 908-03,
DOD Announces Detainee Allowed Access to Lawyer, (Dec. 2, 2003), at
http://www.dod.gov/releases/2003/nr20031202-0717.html. In its news release, the DOD
stated that such access is not required by domestic or international law and should not be
treated as precedent. Id. The policy regarding its decision is that the DOD will permit
access to counsel by an enemy combatant who is a U.S. citizen and who is detained by
DOD in the United States after DOD has determined that such access will not
compromise the national security of the United States, and after DOD has completed
intelligence collection from that detainee or has determined that such access will not
interfere with intelligence collection from that detainee. Id. Despite DOD’s concession,
it has not afforded Mr. Hamdi unfettered access to counsel or authorized his challenge to
his enemy combatant designation. The public defender seeking to represent Hamdi said
he intends to press forward with the Supreme Court petition that calls for Hamdi to be
allowed to contest his combatant designation. Jerry Markon and Dan Eggen, U.S. Allows
Lawyer for Citizen Held as “Enemy Combatant”: Reversal Comes on Eve of Court
Filing, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2003, at A1.
Although on its face the DOD’s decision to allow Hamdi conditional access to counsel
suggests that the executive may be loosening its civil liberties restrictions, the move is
more likely to be another “calculated gesture to help the administration shield its policies
from critcism and reversal by the courts.” Neil A. Lewis, Sudden Shift on Detainee, N.Y.
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TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at A1. As the public awaits for the Supreme Court to decide
whether it will accept Hamdi on certorari, the Court has already agreed to hear the
Guantanamo Bay indefinite detention cases. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Case of
Detainees at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at A1. Although the Supreme
Court would only resolve the jurisdictional issue of whether the federal courts could hear
such a challenge and not whether the detentions are constitutional, the Court’s decision
“was an unmistakeable rebuff of the Bush administration’s insistence that the detainees’
status was a question ‘constitutionally committed to the executive branch’ and not the
business of the federal courts, as Solicitor General Theodore Olsen argued.” Id. Within
the same week that the executive announced it would grant Hamdi access to counsel, the
executive declared that it would release approximately 100 detainees from the
Guantanamo Bay prison—“a shift intended to strengthen the Bush administration’s
contention that it is dealing with detainees in a fair and orderly way so that there is no
need for judicial interference in national-security decisions, legal analysts say.” Charlie
Savage, Guantanamo Ruling Seen Triggering Shift in Policy on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2003, at A6. The administration’s decisions come at a time when a number of its
post–September 11 national security civil liberties restrictions are coming under severe
attack. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently heard oral arguments in Padilla
where two members of the three member panel sharply criticized the executive for its
treatment of enemy combatants, and one judge noted that the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 “didn’t repeal the Constitution.” Furthermore, on December 3,
2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned part of a sweeping 1996 anti-terror
law that prohibits financial assistance or “material support” to organizations the
Department of State has classified as terrorist. Humanitarian Law Project v. United
States Department of Justice, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24305 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003). The
Ninth Circuit held that it is unconstitutional to criminalize donations of “personnel” or
“training” that fall under the “material support” section of the law because it “blurs the
line” on protected free speech. Id. at 60-63. The ruling is a blow to the executive’s
primary strategy to prosecute individuals it claims are suspected terrorists. Eric Lichtblau,
Court Casts Doubt on Parts of Antiterrorism Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at A1.
The executive thus appears to be softening its position in Hamdi in another attempt to
evade meaningful judical review of its national security civil liberties restrictions by
offering last minute concessions to critics of its anti-civil liberties stance.
79
See Order at 2, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (E.D.Va. June 11, 2002) No. 2-02ev.439. (the
U.S. District Court appointed Public Defender Frank Dunham as Hamdi’s counsel).
80
Id. at 279. Even though Quirin allowed enemy combatants access to counsel, the
Fourth Circuit did not address this issue, observing simply that the government is
accorded due deference when making decisions in its war making capacity. Id.
81
Id. In its brief to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the government asserted that
“given the constitutionally limited role of the courts in reviewing military decisions,
courts may not second-guess the military’s determination that an individual is an enemy
combatant and should be detained as such. Id. at 283.
82
Id.
83
Id.
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84

Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
See Unclassified Mobbs Decl., supra note 35.
86
Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 530. Judge Doumar carefully scrutinized the government’s
proof and found it severely inadequate in crucial respects.
Paragraph 1 of the Mobbs Declaration states that Mr. Mobbs is a Special
Adviser to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Mobbs Decl. at 1. The
declaration does not indicate what authority a ‘Special Advisor’ has regarding
classification decisions of enemy combatants. Indeed, the declaration does not
indicate whether Mr. Mobbs was appointed by the President, is an officer of
the United States, is a member of the military, or even a paid employee of the
government. During the August 13, 2002, hearing, when asked to explain Mr.
Mobbs’ authority and role in Hamdi’s classification as an enemy combatant,
the Respondents’ counsel was unable to do so. Tr. at 10. In a general way, the
declaration never refers to Hamdi as an ‘illegal’ enemy combatant. The term is
used constantly in Respondents' Memorandum. Nor is there anything in the
declaration about intelligence or the gathering of intelligence from Hamdi.
There is a huge amount of this in legal arguments. There is nothing to indicate
why he is treated differently than all the other captured Taliban. There is no
reason given for Hamdi to be in solitary confinement, incommunicado for over
four months and being held for some eight to ten months without any charges
of any kind. This is clearly an unreasonable length of time to be held in order
to bring criminal charges. So obviously criminal charges are not contemplated.
Id. at 533.
87
Id. at 532.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 533. The district court also considered whether the Geneva Treaty of the Joint
Services Regulations required a different process. Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 528.
93
Id. at 535.
94
Id. A number of judges share District Judge Doumar’s view that the type of review
the executive advocates amounts to a rubber-stamp of its enemy combatant designation.
See e.g. Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 5 (“Unless the courts are now to become rubberstamps for executive overreaching, the government’s position must be rejected.”)
(emphasis added); Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 373 (“the record provides no credible evidence
supporting the Executive’s designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant,” and that the
panel’s “rubberstamp of the Executive’s unsupported designation lacks both the
procedural and substantive content of such review.”) (emphasis added).
95
Hamdi, 316 F. 3d at 473.
96
Id. at 462.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 464.
85
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99

Id. at 476.
Hamdi, 337 F.3d 335, 343.
101
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 473.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 473-74.
104
Id. at 474.
105
Id. at 465.
106
Id. at 473.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Hamdi, 337 F.3d 335.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 368.
112
Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281.
113
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 572.
119
James Risen & Philip Shenon, Traces of Terror: The Investigation: U.S. Says it Halted
Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb, N.Y.TIMES, June 11, 2002, at A1. On June 11,
2002, during a trip to Moscow, Attorney General Ashcroft proclaimed publicly that the
U.S. captured “a known terrorist who was exploring a plan to build and explode a
radiological dispersion device, or ‘dirty bomb,’ in the United States.” According to
Ashcroft, the government obtained information regarding Jose Padilla from Al Qaeda
lieutenant, Abu Zubaydah who “did not identify Mr. Padilla by name, but provided
enough information to allow the Central Intelligence Agency to check with other
sources.” Id. According to reports, much of the intelligence information Abu Zubayadah
has provided government officials has been discredited. Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak,
Threats and Responses: The Suspect; Questioning to be Legal, Humane and Aggressive,
The White House Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A13 .
When questioned at a press briefing on June 11, 2002, in Doha, Qatar, Secretary
Rumsfeld stated that Padilla was “an individual who unquestionably was involved in
terrorist activities against the United States.” Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld,
News Briefing Re: Media availability at the Emiri Diwan, Qatar (June 11, 2002), at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/t06112002_t0611edq.html.
Despite Ashcroft and Rumsfeld’s initial assertions that Padilla is a terrorist who was
involved in a terrorist plot against the United States, later government reports
contradicted Ashcroft and Rumsfeld’s statements. Only two days following the
executive’s designation of Padilla as an enemy combatant, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense stated that “[t]here was not an actual plan. . . . We stopped this man in the initial
planning stages” and the “extent of the actual bomb plot amounted only to ‘some fairly
loose talk.’” Susan Schmidt & Kamran Khan, Lawmakers Questions CIA on Dirty Bomb
100
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Suspect: Administration Officials Wonder if Ashcroft Was Unduly Alarmist in Arrest
Announcement,” WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at A11. Presently, the government has yet
to charge Padilla with wrongdoing and claims that it is holding him primarily for
interrogation purposes. Padilla, 243 F.Supp. 2d at 49-50.
120
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
See Unclassified Mobbs Decl., supra note 35.
124
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (June 11, 2002) No.
2:02cv439.
125
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 576.
126
Id. at 578.
127
Id. at 578–79.
128
Id.
129
Respondent’s Response, supra note 65, at 5-6.
130
Although the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi held that the public defender could not act as
Hamdi’s next friend because he did not have a significant relationship with Hamdi, Judge
Mukasey explained that Hamdi was distinguishable. The government seized Hamdi in
Afghanistan and, upon learning that he was an American citizen, transferred him to a
military base in Norfolk, Virginia. Thus, Hamdi never had the opportunity to meet his
public defender, Frank Durham, and establish a “significant relationship” with him.
Furthermore, Hamdi’s father was available to act as his next friend. In contrast, Padilla
did meet with Donna Newman for a significant period while they were challenging
Padilla’s initial detention as a material witness. As a result, she had established a
“significant relationship” with Padilla and did have standing to file the habeas petition on
his behalf. Id. at 576.
131
Id. at 578.
132
Id. at 581-82.
133
Id. at 587.
134
The court focused heavily on a passage that distinguished the treatment of lawful
combatants from unlawful combatants: “[like lawful combatants], [u]nlawful combatants
are . . . subject to capture and detention but in addition they are subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals” Id. at 594-95. However, rather than conceding that
Quirin, at a minimum, requires unlawful combatants to be charged and tried in military
tribunals, the district court construed the passage to mean that the executive can
unilaterally designate an American citizen an enemy combatant and detain him without
access to counsel, trial and judicial review.
I read the quoted sentence to mean that as between detention alone, and trial by
a military tribunal with exposure to the penalty actually meted out to
petitioners in Quirin—death—or, at the least, exposure to a sentence of
imprisonment intended to punish and deter, the Court regarded detention
alone, with the sole aim of preventing the detainee from rejoining hostile
forces—a consequence visited upon captured lawful combatants—as certainly
lesser of the consequences an unlawful combatant could face. If, as seems
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obvious, the Court in fact regarded detention alone as a lesser consequence,
then our case is a fortiori from Quirin as regards the lawfulness of detention
under the law of war.
Id.

135

In justifying its failure to meaningfully review the executive’s enemy combatant
designation of Padilla, Judge Mukasey explained,
The order [under review] arises in the context of foreign relations and national
security, where a court’s deference to the political branches of national
government is considerable. It is the President who wields ‘delicate, plenary
and exclusive power . . . as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for
its exercise an act of Congress.’. . .This deference extends to military
designations of individuals as enemy combatants in times of active hostilities,
as well as to their detention after capture on the field of battle.
Id. at 605.
136
Id. at 607.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 608 (quoting Justice Jackson in Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661
(1981), “we decide difficult cases presented to us by virtue of our commissions, not our
consequences.”).
139
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246.
140
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 23. (“[T]he Executive proposes a form of review that
would completely eviscerate the independent role of Article III courts in our
constitutional structure.”)
141
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
142
Id.
143
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(2)(B).
144
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
145
Id. at 600-01.
146
Id. at 608.
147
See supra Section III(B).
148
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 23.
149
See Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985).
150
Id. at 456 (there is “some evidence” to support a factual determination when “the
record is not so devoid of evidence that the . . . findings [are] without support or
otherwise arbitrary”).
151
Id. at 455.
152
Id.
153
See Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 720–21 (7th Cir. 1996); Viens v. Daniels, 871
F.2d 1328, 1335 (7th Cir. 1989).
154
Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (“[Padilla] is entitled to present evidence considered
alongside the Mobbs Declaration, and to have that evidence considered alongside the
Mobbs Declaration.”).
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155

See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Summary Judgment at the Crossroads: The Impact of
the Celotex Triology, 12 UNIV. HAW. L. REV. 1 (1990).
156
Id.
157
Although there have been rare instances where petitioners have prevailed under the
some evidence standard, coupled with Judge Mukasey’s limited access to counsel ruling,
the court predetermined the executive in Padilla would win. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135, 151, 155–56 (1945) (deportation order could not be sustained under some
evidence standard when attorney general’s decision rested on unsworn statements by
cooperating witness who denied making them); Goff v. Burton, 91F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th
Cir. 1996) (informant’s testimony did not meet even minimal standards); Meeks, 81 F.3d
at 720-21 (urine test showing drug use insufficient under ‘some evidence’ standard when
it bore incorrect prisoner number and inmate established there was more than one person
with his name at the institution).
158
Respondent-Appellant’s Brief, Padilla v. Bush, at 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-2235)
[hereinafter Respondent Brief]. The Executive advocated that courts defer to the
President and conduct no factual inquiry into Padilla’s detention:
In view of the great deference owed the President’s determination that Padilla
is an enemy combatant and the serious separation-of-powers concerns that
would attend any searching inquiry into the factual underpinnings of the
President’s judgment, a factual review of the President’s determination can
extend no further than ensuring that it has some evidentiary support.
Id. (emphasis added).
159
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 24.
160
Id. at 4 (contending “the type of judicial review the executive suggests would be a
sham process.”). Padilla cannot meaningfully rebut the executive’s evidence against him,
since he cannot conduct discovery or challenge the credibility of the Mobbs Declaration
through cross-examination. According to prominent retired federal judges,
the Executive proposes a form of review that would completely eviscerate the
independent role of Article III courts in our constitutional structure. The
court’s role would be reduced to a rubber-stamp, with the sole criteria for
review being whether the government has managed to draft and file an
affidavit that was not, on its face, wholly implausible. So long as the affidavit
was provided, the court would be barred from hearing the prisoner’s side of the
story.
Id. at 31.
161
Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (motion for reconsideration granted).
162
In granting the motion for reconsideration, the district court indicated that the
Executive’s untimely filing was a sanctionable offense. Id. at 48–49.
163
Id. at 43–44.
Because the government’s motion was filed more than a month after the
Opinion, and includes an affidavit without the benefit of court order, and
because of the casuistry the government has employed in an effort to justify its
disregard of the cited rule, there is need to review both the briefing that
preceded the Opinion, and the procedural steps that followed it.
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164

Id. at 43.
Id. at 44 (“Appended to the government’s memorandum in support of the motion is the
declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency,
sworn to January 9, 2003 (‘Jacoby Declaration’), supplemented . . . by a sealed version
containing additional details (the ‘Sealed Jacoby Declaration’).”). Id. at 46.
166
Id. at 47.
167
Id. at 46.
168
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 19.
Indeed, the Executive’s desire to create a “sense of dependency” and
hopelessness in Padilla by depriving him of all procedural protections is
nothing more than a modern version of the Star Chamber. . . . The Executive
contends that its intelligence-gathering needs justify departure from these timetested principles. Invoking the term “enemy combatant,” the Executive asks
this court to place its imprimatur on practices that brazenly disregard the
protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. But prisoners brought before the
Star Chamber and accused of plotting against the King also had valuable
intelligence information. Throughout history, totalitarian regimes have
attempted to justify their acts by designating individuals as “enemies of the
state” who were unworthy of any legal rights or protections. These tactics are
no less despicable, and perhaps even more so, when they occur in a country
that purports to be governed by the rule of law.
Id. at 19–20. (emphasis added).
169
In addressing the Jacoby Declaration, Judge Mukasey contended that the assertions
were speculative:
[I]t is important to recognize that that forecast is speculative—as is clear from
repeated use of such words as ‘might’ and ‘could.’ . . . Moreover, the forecast
speculates not about an intelligence-related matter in which Admiral Jacoby is
expert, but about matters of human nature—Padilla’s in particular—in which,
most respectfully, there are no true experts.
Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
170
Judge Mukasey explained that
both the Jacoby Declaration and the Sealed Jacoby Declaration are silent on
the following two subjects: (i) the particulars of Padilla’s actual interrogation
thus far, and what they suggest about the prospect of obtaining additional
information from him, and (ii) when, if at all, intelligence personnel have ever
experienced effects of an interruption in interrogation like the effects predicted
in both of the excerpts from the Jacoby Declaration. . . .
Id. at 50-51.
171
Id. at 54.
172
Respondent Brief, supra note 158, at 48 (“The some evidence standard suitably
addresses that concern by looking solely to the evidence before the Executive at the time
of the challenged determination.”) (emphasis added).
173
Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
174
Id.
165
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175

Id.
Id.
177
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 5.
In the Executive’s view, an Article III court’s role is limited solely to
ascertaining whether the government has submitted an ex parte affidavit that
not facially incredible; so long as the government complies with this pro forma
requirement, the court cannot even ask to hear the prisoner’s side of the case.
Id. (emphasis added).
178
In response to Admiral Jacoby’s argument that access to counsel would afford Padilla
hope and cause him not to cooperate with interrogators, Judge Mukasey explained that
allowing Padilla access might alert him to the hopelessness of his situation under the
some evidence standard:
nowhere does Admiral Jacoby discuss the possibility that if Padilla consulted
with counsel, made whatever submission he was inclined to make, if any, and
lost in short order, as he well might under a “some evidence” standard, the
assured hopelessness of his situation would quickly become apparent to him.
Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (2003) (emphasis added).
179
“It is a paradox of the government’s own making that what prevents Padilla from
becoming aware of the possibility that his avenues of appeal could be swiftly foreclosed
is that he is not permitted to consult with a lawyer.” Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
180
Id. at 56.
181
Id.
182
See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Judge Mukasey’s
Order Granting Government’s Motion for Interlocutory Appeal).
183
Id. at 220.
184
See id.
185
See supra Section III(B). Furthermore, if the Second Circuit ruled in Padilla’s favor,
both Hamdi and Padilla would be ripe for Supreme Court examination because there
would be conflicting circuit court rulings. However, were the Fourth Circuit to decide
both cases in the executive’s favor, there would be no conflicting rulings. Given the
Supreme Court’s apparent reluctance to hear cases arising out of the war on terror, the
Supreme Court could conceivably deny certiorari on both cases, letting the rulings stand
while Hamdi and Padilla languish in perpetuity. At a minimum, even if the Supreme
Court did take Hamdi up on certiorari (cert. petition pending), the executive could
continue delaying adjudication of Padilla, perhaps even until the Supreme Court ruled in
Hamdi.
186
Judge Mukasey writes,
The government urges that I certify for interlocutory appeal the determination
that Padilla’s attorney, Donna Newman, may act as next friend in pursuing the
habeas corpus petition that even the government does not deny Padilla may
file—a ruling that I cannot imagine will be open to serious question—as well
as the determination that Secretary Rumsfeld is a proper respondent here and
the ruling that Padilla may confer with his lawyers. The government does not
suggest among the issues worthy of certification the core ruling in this
176
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proceeding so far—that President Bush has the power to direct the detention of
an American citizen captured in the United States as an enemy combatant—or
the court’s determination that the ‘some evidence’ standard will guide the
decision as to whether that presidential power has been exercised properly or
not in this case, even though the latter holdings might seem to less partisan
eyes to present a ‘substantial ground for difference of opinion,’ 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), and at least as worthy of interlocutory review as the issues the
government has proffered.
Padilla, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
187
Id. at 223. In addition, on its motion for reconsideration the executive suggested that
the court grant Padilla’s requested preliminary injunction allowing Padilla access to
counsel to promote judicial economy. The district court maintained the executive’s afterthe-fact suggestion was strategically meant to assure the executive immediate appeal to
the Second Circuit, particularly in the event that either the district court or Second Circuit
did not grant the discretionary interlocutory appeal: “Although the government has
suggested that issuance of an injunction might ‘promote judicial economy,’ that
suggestion invites an order that can have no certain effect other than to assure that the
government can appeal. . . .” Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
188
On November 17, 2003, a three member panel of the Second Circuit of the U.S. Court
of Appeals heard oral arguments in Padilla. Two of the judges sharply interrogated
government lawyers regarding the executive’s policy on enemy combatants. Judge
Rosemary S. Pooler questioned the government’s position that Congress had intended to
grant the executive such extraordinary powers: “If, in fact, the battlefield is in the United
States, I think Congress has to say that, and I don’t think they have yet,” adding that “as
terrible as September 11 was, it didn’t repeal the Constitution.” Judge Barrington D.
Parker opined that “[w]ere we to construe the Constitution as permitting this kind of
power in the executive with only modest judicial review, we would be effecting a sea
change in the constitutional life of this country and making changes that would be
unprecedented in civilized society.” Michelle Garcia, Appeals Court Weighs Case of
Enemy Combatant: Judge Questions Executive Branch Powers in Patriot Act, WASH.
POST, Nov. 18, 2003, at A3. The third member of the panel, Judge Richard C. Wesley,
seemed to side with the government on the jurisdictional issue suggesting that the case
should not have been brought in New York: “This should be litigated in South Carolina,”
where Padilla is incarcerated. Larry Neumeister, Court to Rule on ‘Enemy Combatant’
Label, COMMERCIAL. APPEAL, Nov. 18, 2003, at A4.
On December 18, 2003, in 2-1 decision the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
absent explicit congressional authorization, the executive lacks the power under Article II
of the Constitution to detain American citizens as enemy combatants captured on U.S.
soil outside a zone of combat. Padilla v. Rumseld, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25616 at 5
(2nd Cir. Dec. 18, 2003). The court also concluded 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000) (the
“Non-Detention Act”) requires explicit congressional authorization and that Congress’
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) (“Joint Resolution”) was not such an authorization. Id. The court held that
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the Southern District of New York did have jurisdiction to hear the case and that
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was the proper respondent. Id.
The court, however, did not express an opinion on whether the executive had the
power to detain as an enemy combatant an American citizen captured in a zone of active
combat like Hamdi. Id. at 7. In addition, the court contended that its ruling mooted
arguments raised by both parties regarding access to counsel, standard of review, and
burden of proof. Id. The court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
issue a writ of habeas corpus directing Secretary Rumsfeld to release Padilla from
military custody within 30 days. Id. The court observed that the executive could then
either transfer Padilla to the proper civilian authorities to be charged as a criminal or hold
him as a material witness in connection with grand jury proceedings, with full
constitutional protections. Id.
Shortly after the ruling, the Department of Justice commented that it would seek a stay
of the ruling as government lawyers consider whether to appeal to the Second Circuit en
banc or directly to the Supreme Court. Scott McClellan, White House spokesman, called
the ruling “troubling and flawed” and “really inconsistent with the clear constitutional
authority of the president and his responsibility.” David Stout, Courts Deal Blow to Bush
on Treatment of Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at A1.
189
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 5 (“Unless the courts are now to become rubberstamps for executive overreaching, the government’s position must be rejected.”)
(emphasis added). Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 341 (“[T]he record provides no credible evidence
supporting the Executive’s designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant” and that the
panel’s “rubberstamp of the Executive’s unsupported designation lacks both the
procedural and substantive content of such review.”) (emphasis added). See Hamdi, 243
F. Supp. 2d at 535. (Opining that by accepting the Mobbs Declaration at face value, the
court would be “abdicating any semblance of the most minimal level of judicial
review...acting as little more than a rubber stamp.”) (emphasis added).
190
See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 8 (noting that the existence of war or generally exigent
circumstances, of themselves, do not abrogate the Court’s role in assuring constitutional
guarantees); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649–50 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring); see generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a
Jurisprudence of Civl liberties In Times of Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11 (1988).
191
See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 79; United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967);
N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
192
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981) (advocating a
“process” view of the judiciary’s role in guarding the liberties of “discrete and insular
minorities”).
193
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124 (opining during times of commotion, when “the passions of
men are aroused and the restraints of law weakened,” constitutional liberties “need and
should receive, the watchful care of those instrusted [sic] with the guardianship of the
Constitution and laws”–the courts).
194
See Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. 1406.
195
See id.; ELY, supra note 192; Edward Keynes, Democracy, Judicial Review and War
Powers, 8 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 69, 75 (1981) (“since a basic objective of American

VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 1 • 2003

192 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

constitutionalism is to advance the individuals freedom or liberty, judicial review can
serve to protect individuals and minorities against repressive and intemperate
majorities.”); see generally United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4
(1938) (calling for a “more searching judicial inquiry” of majoritarian political processes
that disadvantage “discrete and insular minorities” who have minimal access to political
power).
196
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 224-25 (noting the adage that the war power of the
government ‘is the power to wage war successfully,’ suggesting that courts should refrain
from scrutinizing government exercises of its war powers) (Frankfuter, J., concurring);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (“The case arises in the context of
Congress’ authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other
areas has the Court accorded Congress greater deference.”).
197
Id.; see Green v. Spock, 249 U.S. 47 (1976) (upholding military ban on civilian
political speech on open public sidewalks on military bases); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280
(1981) (upholding secretary of state’s power to revoke passports of citizens deemed
threats to national security).
198
Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-65.
199
Melchero v. Federal Open Market Committee, 836 F.2d 651, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(under a checks and balances constitutional scheme, the courts should not resolve “issues
that are appropriately left to the [elective] legislative arena”).
200
Finona Doherty et al., A Year of Loss: Reexamining Civil Liberties since Sept. 11,
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, at 1.
201
See Amicus Curiae Brief of Fred Korematsu, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696 (4th
Cir. Oct. 7, 2003) (describing executive national security abuses of civil liberties under
the 1798 Sedition Act, the 1917 Espionage Act, the 1919-20 Palmer Raids, the 1942
Japanese American Internment, and the 1950s McCarthyism and the Smith Act); see also
David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terror, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003).
202
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 79 (scrutinizing and then rejecting President Truman’s
contention that in the prosecution of the Korean War, national security required
government seizure of steel mills embroiled in a labor dispute).
203
Id.
204
See generally WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES DURING
WAR TIME (1998).
205
See, e.g., Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564; N. Jersey Media Group,
308 F.3d 198.
206
See generally Yamamoto, supra note 20; Saito, supra note 4; Letti Volpp, The Citizen
As Terrorist, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1575 (2002); PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note
16; Hamdi, 337 F.3d 335. Comparing Hamdi to Korematsu, Judge Motz reminded the
panel that the High Court’s earlier deference to the executive’s DeWitt Report, also
prepared by military officials, upheld Fred Korematsu’s conviction for remaining in his
home. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit based its ruling in Hamdi solely on the Mobbs
Declaration. Echoing Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu, Judge Motz warned that
when the executive “oversteps the bound[s] of constitutionality . . . it is an incident,” but
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when a court “review[s] and approve[s], that passing incident becomes doctrine.” Id. at
375.
207
Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 41–43.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 42.
211
See supra Section II(A).
212
See e.g., Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564; American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Ashcroft, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (S.D.Cal. 2003) (challenging
the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s special registration procedures targeting
primarily Arab and Muslim non-citizen males for registration); Center for Nat’l Sec.
Studies v. United States Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (arguing for
release of September 11 detainee names); Muslim Community Ass’n of Ann Arbor et al.
v. Ashcroft, Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Civil Action No. 03-72913
(E.D.Mi. July 7, 2003), available at http://news.corporate.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/
mcaa2ash73003cmp.pdf. (ACLU suit on behalf on Arab American challenging
constitutionality of the PATRIOT Act); Electronic Privacy Info. Center v. Office of
Homeland Security, Civ. Action No. 02-620 (CKK) (Dec. 26, 2002) (on file with author).
(challenging the prohibition of Freedom of Information Act disclosures); Benevolence
Int’l Foundation v. John Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D.Ill. 2002) (challenging the
government’s seizure of Illinois charity proceeds while the government investigates
whether organization has ties to terrorism); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 02-CV-02307-JG
(E.D.N.Y 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/turkmenash
41702cmp.pdf (alleging Arab and Muslim men detained after the September 11 attacks
were abused in prisons); United States of America v. Osama Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d
55, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (alleging Arab and Muslim men detained after the September 11
attacks were abused in prisons); N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d 198 (challenging
government’s blanket closing of deportation proceedings of September 11 detainees);
Detroit Free Press, 308 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (challenging government’s blanket
closing of deportation proceedings of September 11 detainees); Al Odah v. United States,
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (challenging indefinite detention of Guantanamo Bay
prisoners); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (challenging
indefinite detention of Guantanamo Bay prisoners); M.K.B. v. Warden, No. 03-6747
(S.Ct. filed July 1, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/scotus/
mkbwarden62703cpet.pdf (challenging how far courts can go to seal all legal filings and
the entire docket in a federal habeas corpus case, without issuing any findings in support
of sealing the file).
213
See e.g. Gibbons Brief, supra note 10; ABA Brief, supra note 70; Neal R. Sonnett et
al., Preliminary Report, A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY
COMBATANTS (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/enemy_combatants.pdf.; Hamdi, 337 F.3d 335 (Motz, J., dissenting).
214
In Korematsu, the Court gave near absolute deference to the executive’s military
necessity claims despite its pronouncement of strict scrutiny. See generally Eric K.
Yamamoto & Susan Kiyomi Serrano, The Loaded Weapon, 28 AMERASIA 51 (2002).
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215

Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 11.
See Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564; Detroit Free Press, 308 F.3d
681; N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d 198.
217
Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283 (“The government thus submits that we may not review at all
its designation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant—that its determinations on
this score are the first and final word.”); Respondents’ Response, supra note 65, at 13
(“[W]hether Padilla at some future time may be charged with violating domestic criminal
law (or the laws of war) has no bearing on whether he is presently an enemy combatant
subject to detention during wartime).
218
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01.
219
Id.
220
See supra Section III.
221
Id.
222
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 24.
223
Courts are competent to assess the effects of government actions in assessing their
validity. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
224
Suggesting that as a matter of law, the executive does not have the power to
unilaterally designate an American citizen an enemy combatant and detain him
indefinitely absent fundamental liberties, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) explicitly states, “No
citizen shall be . . . detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”
Furthermore, the historic purpose of the writ of habeas was to prevent executive detention
of citizens absent judicial review. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953). During times of national threat, the Constitution
through the Suspension Clause allows suspension of habeas. However, the Suspension
clause resides in Article I. Accordingly, only Congress, not the Executive, can suspend
judicial scrutiny of executive detention. Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 7; U.S. Const.
Art. I, § 9 cl. 2; Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.Md. 1861); Ex parte
Bollman, 8. U.S. 75, 101 (1807).
225
In assessing whether the means are appropriately tailored, courts can examine what
procedures and standards would govern the executive’s enemy combatant designation of
American citizens and ensure that the individual can contest his detention through habeas
proceedings and that he has full access to counsel. Sonnett, supra note 213, at 21–24.
226
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 27–28.
Amici submit that the Constitution requires at least clear and convincing
evidence before a person may be held in custody for an extended or indefinite
period of time, as the Executive has already imposed here … Moreover, to the
extent that a detention is punitive in nature—as detention of ‘unlawful
combatants’ arguably may be—the Constitution requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id.
227
18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2003). The law permits detention of a material witness only to
guarantee his testimony in a criminal proceeding and only if the government can show he
is a flight risk or his testimony can be obtained only through detention. Material
216
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witnesses are not criminal suspects and, therefore, their detention should not exceed the
time necessary to secure their depositions.
228
Doherty, supra note 200 at 16; See also Edward Alden & Caroline Daniel, Battle
Lines Blurred as U.S. Searches for Enemies in the War on Terrorism: LIBERTY AND
SECURITY: Technology Provides the Means, September 11 the Justification. FINANCIAL
TIMES (London), January 2, 2003, at 11; Editorial, A Lesson Learned from Evansville,
BALT. SUN, June 22, 2003, at 4C.
229
See Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55; In re Application of the United States for a
Material Witness, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13234 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2002).
230
The government has used preventative detention as a strategy for fighting its war on
terror. The theory appeared to be that detention, based primarily on race, religion and
ethnicity, would prevent those detained from proving to be a threat—an “arrest and detain
first, ask questions later” approach. Doherty, supra note 200, at 14. Employing the term
“suspected terrorist,” the Attorney General explained,
We will arrest and detain any suspected terrorist who has violated the law. If
suspects are found not to have links to terrorism or not to have violated the
law, they’ll be released. But terrorists who are in violation of the law will be
convicted, in some cases be deported, and in all cases be prevented from doing
further harm to Americans.
Department of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft Outlines Foreign Terrorist Tracking
Task Force, Oct. 31, 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/
agcrisisremarks10_31.htm.
231
Id.
232
UNITED STATES: PRESUMPTION OF GUILT, 14 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 16 (2002),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/USA0802.pdf.
233
Doherty, supra note 200, at 18.
234
Id.
According to lawyers representing a number of detainees, it is now common
for the INS to fail to charge individuals within the prescribed 48 hours. The
bipartisan effort in Congress to include in the USA PATRIOT Act a seven-day
charge requirement to curb abuse of new government powers has been
completely ineffectual. Current practice under INS regulations involves
detention without charge not only for a week, but for months.
Id.
235
Doherty, supra note 200, at 14–15.
236
As Human Rights Watch reported, “the detainees were interrogated as if they were
accused criminals in conditions that were punitive in nature.” Id. at 16.
237
According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights report,
[I]n United States of America v. Osama Awadallah [202 F. Supp. 2d 55
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)], the use of material witness warrants to detain individuals for
potential testimony before a grand jury was rule unlawful. Awadallah is a
lawful permanent resident in the United States and was held in solitary
confinement in the maximum-security wing . . . for 20 days, based solely on
the material witness warrant. The government made several misrepresen-
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tations and omissions in order to get an arrest warrant and during the time
Awadallah was imprisoned, the government failed to take steps to secure his
deposition. In ordering his release, Judge Shira Scheindlin said that “since
1789, no Congress has granted the government the authority to imprison an
innocent person in order to guarantee that he will testify before a grand jury
conducting a criminal investigation.
Doherty, supra note 200, at 16; But see In re the Application of the United States, 2002
U.S. Dist. Lexis 13234 (upholding material witness detentions for grand jury testimony).
238
See generally Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681; North Jersey Media, 308 F.3d 198.
239
According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, “lawyers for detainees
subject to these measures believe that a secrecy order casts suspicion on their clients
which may affect their client’s ability to get a fair hearing.” Doherty, supra note 200, at
20. Similarly, the government in Korematsu presumed Japanese Americans were
disloyal based on their race and denied them individualized hearings to determine
disloyalty. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
240
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
241
Detroit Free Press, 3030 F.3d at 702.
242
The district court in N. Jersey Media applied the executive’s method and reviewed the
blanket closing under rational basis. N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d 198. The district court in
Detroit Free Press, however, rejected the executive’s approach and reviewed the blanket
closing under strict scrutiny. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 608.
243
Id. at 709–10 (emphasis added) (“the government seeks to protect from disclosure the
bits and pieces of information that seem innocuous in isolation, but when pieced together
with other bits and pieces aid in creating a bigger picture of the Government’s antiterrorism investigation, i.e., ‘the mosaic intelligence’”). Id.
244
See Yamamoto, supra note 20.
245
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 5-11.
246
See supra Section IV(B).
247
See supra Section IV.
248
Id.
249
Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 28 (“Recognizing this [constitutional] safeguard need
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